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The Right to Counsel: Collateral
Issues Affecting Due Process
Joseph D. Grano*
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the right of defendants, rich and poor, to
have the assistance of counsel has been established as a funda-
mental right in the American administration of criminal jus-
tice.' This right was won after years of struggle and ardent
debate during which many defendants were forced to rely on their
own ingenuity in order to obtain a fair trial.2 With the struggle
finally over, at least in felony cases,3 it is now possible to turn
to collateral issues which, of necessity, were generally ignored
during the years of debate. Three significant issues involve the
defendant's right and ability to conduct the entire defense by
himself, the waiver of objections to unconstitutional government
conduct and the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
A. DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO CONDUCT THE ENTIRE DEFENSE
This issue may arise when a mentally competent defendant
decides to waive counsel but the judge refuses to accept the
waiver.4 The judge may do this for one of many reasons, in-
* Instructor in Legal Research and Writing, University of Illinois
College of Law.
This article is based on the author's Master of Laws thesis. The
author wishes to acknowledge the valuable assistance of Professor
Wayne R. LaFave, University of Illinois College of Law, in the planning
and preparation of this article. The author, of course, accepts full re-
sponsibility for the views expressed herein.
1. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
2. For a significant contribution to the debate, see Kamisar, The
Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Dialoque on "The
Most Pervasive Right" of an Accused, 30 U. CH. L. REv. 1 (1962).
3. In Patterson v. Warden, 372 U.S. 776 (1963), the Supreme
Court in a per curiam decision reversed and remanded, for further con-
sideration in light of Gideon, a misdemeanor conviction involving
several years imprisonment. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has sub-
sequently denied certiorari in cases where trial counsel was denied to a
misdemeanant. See Winters v. Beck, 239 Ark. 1151, 397 S.W.2d 364,
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 907 (1966); DeJoseph v. Connecticut, 3 Conn.
624, 222 A.2d 752, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 982 (1966). For a discussion of
this new battleground, see Junker, The Right to Counsel in Misdemeanor
Cases, 43 WASH. L. REV. 685 (1968); Katz, Municipal Courts-Another
Urban I1, 20 CASE RES. L. REV. 87 (1968).
4. United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, DiBlasi v. McMann, 384 U.S. 1007 (1966).
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cluding a concern that the defendant. cannot adequately defend
himself. In such a case the defendant might argue on appeal
that he was denied a constitutional right to proceed pro se. The
issue may also arise when a defendant accepts appointed counsel
at the outset but during trial becomes disenchanted with counsel's
tactics and asks to have him discharged.5 It may be unclear to
the trial judge whether the accused wants counsel discharged so
that he may proceed pro se or so that another attorney may be
appointed. A new appointment is unlikely in the vast ma-
jority of cases and the trial judge must decide whether he will
discharge counsel or force the accused to remain with counsel
he no longer wants. If the judge discharges counsel and permits
the defendant to conduct his own defense, the defendant is likely
to argue on appeal that he never unequivocally waived the right
to counsel. On the other hand, if the trial judge is not satisfied
that the defendant has waived counsel and therefore refuses to
grant a discharge, the defendant is likely to argue that he was
denied his right to proceed pro se.6
An inquiry into whether there is or should be a right to
waive counsel necessarily leads to the question why waiver of
counsel is even permitted. If it is concluded that certain cir-
cumstances can justify forcing representation on the accused,
might not the accused argue that the same circumstances require
forced representation?. One might conclude that the solution
to all of these problems is mandatory assistance of counsel for
all defendants. Such a contention merits examination.
B. WAIVING OBJECTIONS To UNCONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNvMENT
CONDUCT
Regardless of whether counsel should never, sometimes or
always be forced on an accused, a second salient problem for
courts is the effect of representation on other constitutional
rights. Suppose the defendant is. on trial for a serious crime.
Trial counsel, knowing or suspecting that discrimination ex-
isted in jury impaneling, foregoes objecting because he believes
that an objection would increase the hostility and ill will toward
his client.7 Furthermore, during trial the prosecutor intro-
5. In the recent, greatly publicized trial of the "Chicago Eight,"
a defendant, Seale, insisted that counsel of record was not his lawyer
and that he had a constitutional right 'to proceed pro se. The judge
denied the request.
6. See notes 62-64 infra.
7. See Whitus v. Balkcom, 333 F.21d 496 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 931 (1964).
1176 [Vol. 54:1175
THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
duces a confession which counsel thinks is coerced, but counsel
fails to object for tactical reasons, such as a desire to get ex-
culpatory statements in the confession before the jury. Or sup-
pose counsel makes a futile objection to the confession at trial
but decides not to appeal, or not to raise the objection on appeal.
Assuming that objections in each of the above instances would
be valid, a conviction in the absence of an objection would be
tainted by unconstitutional government conduct. Yet, if the
defendant tried to assert these objections in post-trial proceed-
ings, he most likely would be told that his rights were waived.
Many defendants argue, however, that acceptance of counsel's
assistance should not entail the risk that such fundamental con-
stitutional rights may be forfeited.8 The argument is that a
waiver should not be valid unless the accused personally con-
sented to it.
Even if counsel is empowered to make waiver decisions,
other problems confront the post-trial judiciary. The accused
may assert that counsel did not "deliberately"9 waive a "known
right or privilege."' 0 In most cases, the trial record cannot re-
solve the issue; at most, it indicates the fact that counsel did
not object but supplies no reasons for counsel's omission. Must
the post-trial court hold a hearing to determine whether a valid
waiver was made?". An affirmative answer places a great bur-
den on the judiciary; a negative answer leaves the issue to be
resolved by speculation.
These issues revolve around the right to counsel. Never-
theless, it is not difficult to conclude that the waiver doctrine
is the source of the problem. Hence, one cannot examine the
effect of the right to counsel on the accused's other constitu-
tional rights without reconsidering the waiver doctrine. One solu-
tion is to adopt a rule prohibiting the waiver of objections
to unconstitutional government conduct and to require a pre-trial
hearing to determine whether any of the prosecution's evidence
was unconstitutionally obtained; this course of action too war-
rants consideration.
C. THE CLAIM OF INEFFEcTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
A third perplexing issue involves the claim of ineffective
8. For purposes of analysis, constitutional rights that involve ob-jections to unconstitutional government conduct are distinguished from
constitutional rights that do not. The nature of and the reasons for the
distinction are discussed in section HI infra.
9. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 439 (1963).
10. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
11. See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
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assistance of counsel.12 The accused may claim that an appoint-
ment of counsel on the eve of trial did not afford counsel suffi-
cient time to prepare; or, the accused may assert that counsel did
not adequately use the time he had to prepare. The accused
may also assert that counsel was ineffective because he failed to
consult the accused before making decisions. Finally, counsel's
actual handling of the case may be attacked. The last assertion
often becomes intertwined with the waiver issue; if counsel ad-
mits that he deliberately waived a certain right for tactical pur-
poses, the accused may assert that counsel's choice of tactics was
egregious. The law resolving these disputes should be compatible
with the law governing the right to proceed pro se; the law
should not force counsel on the accused and then abandon the
accused to inadequate representation.
D. PRELUDE
In considering these problems several considerations served
as points of departure. It was presumed that the best system
is one which maximizes fairness and that fairness is maxinized
when the defendant is enabled to present his best defense to
the charges against him.13 As an absolute, the latter objective
is impossible to achieve because the system depends on human
beings. Therefore, the goal must be a system that maximizes
the likelihood that the defendant's best defense will be presented.
It also was recognized that the volume of post-trial claims
emanating from these problem areas is placing an intolerable
burden on the post-trial judiciary. Questions of fundamental
importance are being left for resolution by this judiciary, which,
being far removed from trial, must struggle to separate the
frivolous claims from the meritorious.
It must also be conceded that there is a growing reluctance
to increase fairness at the expense cof the orderly administration
of criminal justice. Therefore, the goal to maximize fairness
cannot be achieved unless the rules which are implemented for
that purpose lend themselves to new procedures consistent with
an orderly and smoothly functioning system. The goal, then,
is to maximize fairness while minimizing the opportunity to make
frivolous claims.
12. See section IV infra.
13. See Adams v. United States ex Tel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269(1942).
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II. DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO CONDUCT
THE ENTIRE DEFENSE
A. THE SCOPE OF THE RIGHT TO PRocEE Pro Se
1. When the Choice is Made Before Trial
Although dicta long ago suggested the validity of trials in
which the defendant had elected to proceed without counsel, 14 it
was not until 1938 in Johnson v. Zerbst 5 that the issue was
faced directly. There the Supreme Court, relying on the
sixth amendment, held that an indigent defendant in a federal
court cannot be deprived of his life or liberty "unless he has or
waives the assistance of counsel."' 6  The waiver, said the
Court, must be intentionally and knowingly made.17 But it is
one thing to say that a trial is constitutionally valid when there
is a proper waiver of counsel and quite another to say that a
criminal defendant has a constitutional right to waive counsel.
Dicta supporting the latter proposition were not long in com-
ing. In Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann,'8 the Court
stated: "The right to assistance of counsel and the correlative
right to dispense with a lawyer's help are not legal formalisms.
They rest on considerations that go to the substance of an ac-
cused's position before the law."' 9
The issue before the Court, however, was not whether one
has a right to waive the assistance of counsel but whether
a conviction can be valid if a defendant who is proceeding pro se
does not have the assistance of counsel at the time he decides to
waive his right to a jury trial. Nevertheless, the language was
ideal for a defendant seeking to overturn unfavorable proceed-
ings when a waiver of counsel had not been permitted. Such a
situation was presented in the Second Circuit case of United
States v. Plattner.20 The district court had denied the de-
fendant's request to be his own lawyer because it felt that he,
being unschooled in the law, would not be able to handle the
trial proceedings. The court of appeals reversed the con-
viction, finding a denial of the sixth amendment right to waive
counsel and proceed pro se. The court recognized that the
14. See Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 72 (1904).
15. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
16. Id. at 463 (emphasis added).
17. Id. at 464.
18. 317 U.S. 269 (1942). Accord, Carter v. fllinois, 329 U.S. 173,
174 (1946); Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155, 161 (1957).
19. 317 U.S. at 279 (emphasis added).
20. 330 F.2d 271 (2d Cir. 1964).
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right to counsel is designed to protect defendants not sufficiently
learned in the law, but it also recognized a "primary right," im-
plied in the sixth amendment, to conduct one's own defense.
The court noted that the Judiciary Act of 1789,21 which gives
the parties in federal courts the right to manage their own
causes, had become law just one day before the sixth amend-
ment was proposed in Congress. If Congress had intended to
repeal the right it had given by statute, it would have stated so
expressly. The only logical conclusion, said the court, was that
the sixth amendment preserved the right to proceed pro se.
Additional support was found in the dicta in Adams22 and
in 37 state constitutions that specifically grant the accused a
right to be heard by himself.2 3
The Second Circuit had another opportunity to explain
its position in United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno,24
when it made it clear that the right was equally applicable to the
states. The court, quoting from the Adams opinion, stated
that the right to proceed pro se is intended to assure the accused
"the means of presenting his best defense."2 5 To this end, rea-
soned the court, the defendant should not be forced to accept
counsel in whom he has no confidence.
The Second Circuit, therefore, has two different reasons
for finding a constitutional right to proceed pro se. First, the
court is convinced that history supports such an interpretation
of the sixth amendment. Second, the court is convinced that
it is not fair to force a defendant to trial with a lawyer he does
not want. The court, however, recognizes two types of fairness.
The first is the fairness of the trial, since the accused must be
able to present his best defense. The second, however, is as-
signed a higher value: the accused must be permitted to make
his worst defense, since "respect for individual autonomy re-
21. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92:
[I]n all the courts of the United States, the parties may plead
and manage their own causes personally or by the assistance
of such counsel or attorneys at law as by the rules of the said
courts respectively shall be permitted to manage and conduct
causes therein.
Similar language is found today in 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1964). See also
FED. R. CamV. P. 44 (1968).
22. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
23. Citations to the state constitutions are found in 330 F.2d at 275.
See also W. BEANY, THE RIGHT TO Comqs.EL n AmmuIEcAN CouRTs 237
(1955).
24. 348 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, DiBlasi v. McMann,
384 U.S. 1007 (1966).
25. Id. at 15, quoting from Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann.
317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942).
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quires that he be allowed to go to jail under his own banner if
he so desires .... ",26
Whatever the reason relied on, a defendant who makes it
clear before trial that he does not want counsel and that he
would prefer to proceed pro se has an absolute right in courts
following the Second Circuit to have his wishes respected.27
2. When the Choice Is Made After Trial Has Begun
Often the post-trial complaint of the defendant is not that
he was denied the right to proceed pro se when he was told of his
right to counsel, but that he was denied the right to dismiss
counsel and proceed pro se after dissatisfaction had arisen.
This claim is not met as generously as the claim that counsel
was forced on the defendant from the outset. If the accused
brings his dissatisfaction to the attention of the trial court and
requests another attorney, he may be told that he is not entitled
to appointed counsel with whom he can agree.28 If he asks for a
continuance to retain counsel, he may be told that a continuance
26. 348 F.2d at 15. Accord, Coleman v. Smyth, 166 F. Supp. 934
(E.D. Va.), appeal dismissed, 260 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1958), cert.
denied, 359 U.S. 946 (1959) (inherent right to defend oneself); People
v. Crovedi, 65 Cal. 2d 199, 205, 417 P.2d 868, 872, 53 Cal. Rptr. 284, 288
(1966). Cf. Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173, 174 (1946): "Neither the
historic conception of Due Process nor the vitality it derives from
progressive standards of justice denies a person the right to defend
himself .... "
27. See the cases cited in note 26 supra. Some federal cases treat
the right to proceed pro se as only statutory: Van Natton v. United
States, 357 F.2d 161, 163-64 (10th Cir. 1966); Butler V. United States,
317 F.2d 249, 258 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 838 (1963); Brown
v. United States, 264 F.2d 363, 365 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 911
(1959). Of course, state cases supporting the right are more numerous
because of specific provisions in their constitutions. See, e.g., People v.
Maddox, 67 Cal. 2d 647, 433 P.2d 163, 63 Cal. Rptr. 371 (1967); People
v. Cooley, 11 Mich. App. 602, 162 N.W.2d 110 (1968).
28. See, e.g., United States v. Burkeen, 355 F.2d 241, 245 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, Matlock v. United States, 384 U.S. 957 (1966);
Arellanes v. United States, 326 F.2d 560, 561 (9th Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 870 (1966); United States v. Birrel, 286 F. Supp. 885,
894 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (but noting that a real conflict of interest calls for
the court to remove the lawyer; id. at 897); Kruchten v. Eyman, 276
F. Supp. 858 (D. Ariz. 1967); People v. Foust, 267 Cal. App. 2d 222, 228,
72 Cal. Rptr. 675, 679 (1968). Contra, People v. Moss, 253 Cal. App.
2d 248, 251, 61 Cal. Rptr. 107, 110 (1967). But cf. People v. Maddox,
67 Cal. 2d 647, 654, 433 P.2d 163, 167, 63 Cal. Rptr. 371, 375 (1967)
(expressing no opinion as to the statement in Moss). A good discussion
supporting the proposition that counsel, and not the defendant, should
be in charge of trial tactics is found in Nelson v. People, 346 F.2d 73, 81
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 964 (1965), discussed at text accom-
panying notes 195-209 infra.
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would disrupt the orderly processes of justice.29 Not being en-
titled to another attorney unless he can give good reason for his
dissatisfaction," the defendant's original decision to accept
counsel becomes a decision to relinquish control over the defense.
Even the Second Circuit, which finds an absolute right
to proceed pro se when the election is made before trial, qualifies
the right when the election is made after the trial has begun.3 '
In the latter instance, another interest is said to compete with
the right to conduct one's own defense-the interest in pre-
venting disruption of the proceedings. The trial judge must
weigh the competing interests and considerable weight is given
to his assessment.32
Elsewhere it has been said that the following interests
justify giving the court supervision over the choice once trial
has begun: (1) the interest in assuring a fair trial to both the
defendant and the state; (2) the interest in protecting the de-
fendant against his own incompetence, and (3) the interest in
granting the defendant every possible right while preserving the
court's capacity to insure orderly procedure. 33
The first interest can be disposed of quickly. If a fair
trial is possible for a defendant who makes a knowing waiver of
counsel in the first instance, it should be equally possible for a
defendant who delays waiver until dissatisfaction arises. To the
extent the state would be denied a faix trial because of the jury's
sympathy for the hapless defendant, this sympathy would be
no less when the defendant begins trial without counsel.3 4 Fur-
29. Defendants who can afford to retain counsel are entitled to do
so in order that they may have counsel of their own choice. See Crooker
v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 439 (1958); :Releford v. United States, 288
F.2d 298, 301-02 (9th Cir. 1961). Abuse of this right is not permitted.
Attempting to discharge an appointed attorney and to retain counsel in
order to postpone trial constitutes abuse. See McGill v. United States,
348 F.2d 791 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (request made four days before trial).
Courts have even refused permission to discharge retained counsel.
See, e.g., Good v. United States, 378 F.2d 9.34 (9th Cir. 1967).
30. The "good reason" requirement may necessitate a showing that
counsel is incompetent. See Arellanes v. United States, 326 F.2d 560,
561 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 870 (1966).
31. See United States v. Catino, 403 F.2d 491 (2d Cir. 1968); United
States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, DiBlasi v. McMann, 384 U.S. 1007 (1966).
32. See United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12, 15
(2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, DiBlasi v. McMann, 384 U.S. 1007 (1966).
33. See People v. Foust, 267 Cal. App. 2d 222, 72 Cal. Rptr. 675
(1968).
34. It has been suggested that this is one of the reasons why de-
fendants elect to waive counsel. Note, The Right of an Accused To Pro-
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thermore, in many cases the defendant's disruptive behavior
makes it doubtful that the jury would give him undeserved sym-
pathy.35 If one argues that a fair trial for either party is impos-
sible because of the disruption to the proceedings, one is really
asserting the last interest. The first interest seems to carry
no force on its own.
The interest in protecting the accused from his own incom-
petence likewise does not justify a distinction based on the time
the right is asserted. If a defendant need not know as much
law as an attorney to waive counsel in the first instance,36 and
if a defendant must be permitted to "venture into the un-
known '37 even if he will harm himself, the interest does not
justify denying a right to discharge counsel.
The third interest is the one most frequently used to deny
the accused the right to discharge counsel and proceed pro se.38
Again, however, it is difficult to see why the proceedings are
less orderly than when the right is asserted before trial.39 There
would be no delay, as there would be in a change of attorneys,
ceed Without Counsel, 49 M nqN. L. REv. 1133, 1134 (1965). It has
also been reported that many prosecutors and judges feel the jury is
prejudiced in favor of an unrepresented defendant. Note, The Repre-
sentation of Indigent Criminal Defendants in the Federal District Courts,
76 HIw. L. REv. 579, 585 (1963).
35. Hopefully, United States v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, Ormento v. United States, 375 U.S. 940 (1963) is not rep-
resentative of the typical disorderly defendant case. Besides verbal
abuse from the 13 defendants, the trial judge had to cope with physi-
cal attacks against the jurors and the hurling of a chair at the assistant
attorney for the government.
36. People v. Ruiz, 263 Cal. App. 2d 216, 223, 69 Cal. Rptr. 473,
479 (1968); People v. Addison, 256 Cal. App. 2d 18, 24, 63 Cal. Rptr.
626, 629 (1967). It has been argued that the right to proceed pro se
would be nullified by requiring the defendant to show some legal skill.
Note, The Right of an Accused, supra note 34, at 1146-47. But cf. Von
Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 723-24 (1948).
37. United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12, 15 (2d
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, DiBlasi v. McMann, 384 U.S. 1007 (1966);
People v. Addison, 256 Cal. App. 2d 18, 24, 63 Cal. Rptr. 626, 629 (1967).
38. See, e.g., Sanchez v. United States, 311 F.2d 327, 332 (9th Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 949 (1963); United States v. Birrell, 286
F. Supp. 885, 895 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); United States v. Foster, 9 F.R.D. 367,
371-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); People v. Nelson, 87 Ill. App. 2d 159, 231 N.E.2d
115 (1967), rev'd in part, 41 Ill. 2d 364, 243 N.E.2d 225 (1968); State v.
Bullock, 71 Wash. 2d 886, 431 P.2d 195 (1967); and cases cited in note
31 supra.
39. It may appear, however, that delaying tactics are being used
when the defendant does not move to discharge counsel until the jury
is selected. See United States ex rel. Davis v. McMann, 386 F.2d 611
(2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 958 (1968).
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if the defendant agreed to proceed without a continuance.40 At
most, a brief continuance might be required to enable the de-
fendant to present evidence which counsel had refused, but the
delay could be kept to a tolerable minhnum.
When the defendant does not move to discharge counsel until
the closing arguments to the jury, the fear is expressed that
permitting discharge would enable the defendant to testify with-
out being subject to cross-examination. 41 Nevertheless, this
fear, if valid, would also justify forcing counsel on the accused
in the first instance.
A third type of disruption is caused by a disorderly de-
fendant or by one making a farce of the proceedings because of
ignorance of the rules of procedure and evidence. This threat
to orderly proceedings, however, can be as strong at the outset
as it is during trial. Indeed, one court, holding the right to
waive counsel always subject to judicial supervision, has upheld
forcing counsel on a defendant whose lack of legal acumen be-
came evident at the voir dire examination. 42 On the other hand,
another court, holding the right to waive counsel always abso-
lute, found a violation of the state constitution in the trial
court's refusal to allow the accused to discharge counsel, even
though the defendant had been unruly enough to require shack-
ling.4 3
Differentiating between requests made before and during
trial cannot, therefore, be justified. If any of the reasons sup-
porting judicial supervision of the right are valid, they are
equally valid before trial begins. The right should be either
always absolute or never absolute; this is the fundamental issue
that must be confronted.
3. Proceeding Pro Se with Counsel
To maintain some control over trial tactics without fore-
going the assistance of counsel, defendants occasionally attempt
to conduct part of their own defense while accepting representa-
tion. The attempt to proceed pro se while represented runs the
gamut of possibilities. The defendant may seek to have the
40. The court in Maldonado considered the defendant's willingness
to proceed immediately as strongly countering the state's argument that
the trial would be delayed and disrupted, 348 F.2d at 16.
41. See, e.g., People v. Von Latta, 258 Cal. App. 2d 329, 337, 65
Cal. Rptr. 651, 656 (1968); State v. Tovnley, 149 iMinn. 5, 23, 182 N.W.
773, 781 (1921).
42. People v. Allen, 37 IL 2d 167, 226 N.E.2d 1, cert. denied, 389
U.S. 907 (1967).
43. People v. Henley, 2 Mich. App. 54, 138 N.W.2d 505 (1965).
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attorney seated at his side while he conducts the entire case; he
may merely wish to examine or cross-examine witnesses or to
address the jury; or he may, in effect, let the attorney conduct
the entire defense.
Although forcing advisory counsel on the defendant has
been held not to violate the right to proceed pro se,44 and al-
though advisory counsel often has been permitted when wanted,45
courts have not been sympathetic to the assertion that there is
a right to counsel in an advisory capacity. It has been noted
that the Judiciary Act gives the defendant a choice only be-
tween proceeding with counsel and personally managing the
case,40 and the act has been upheld against the assertion that it
violates the sixth amendment.47 Courts have also pointed out
that the sixth amendment contains no language suggesting there
is a hybrid of the two rights.4 8
Most frequently, however, courts justify denying the re-
quest by pointing to the interest in orderly trial proceedings.
49
Even in states whose constitutions grant the right to be heard
by oneself and counsel, or the right to be heard by oneself, coun-
sel or "both,"50 the courts have permitted the trial judge to
maintain order by prohibiting the defendant from participating
in his defense.51 If this can be done, it may be questioned
whether there is any substance to the right to proceed pro se.
The right may be low in the order of constitutional priorities.
44. See, e.g., Bayless v. United States, 381 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1967);
Washington v. United States, 214 F.2d 876 (D.C. Cir. 1954); People v.
Allen, 37 Ill. 2d 167, 226 N.E.2d 1, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 907 (1967);
Hatten v. State, 83 Nev. 531, 435 P.2d 495 (1967); Harris v. State, 425
S.W.2d 642 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968).
45. See, e.g., State v. Sinclair, 49 N.J. 525, 231 A.2d 565 (1967).
46. See note 21 supra, for the act in its original form. The rights
are also stated in the alternative in the present act.
47. Shelton v. United States, 205 F.2d 806 (5th Cir.), petition for
cert. dismissed on petitioner's motion, 346 U.S. 892 (1953), motion to
vacate denied, 349 U.S. 943 (1955).
48. See, e.g., United States v. Foster, 9 F.R.D. 367, 372 (S.D.N.Y.
1949).
49. See, e.g., id. at 372; People v. Northcott, 209 Cal. 639, 289
P. 634 (1930); Thompson v. State, 194 So. 2d 649 (Fla. Ct. App. 1967);
Roberts v. State, 14 Ga. 18 (1853).
50. United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271, 275 (2d Cir. 1964),
cites 27 state constitutions using the conjunctive and six that specifically
grant both rights.
51. See, e.g., People v. Mattson, 51 Cal. 2d 777, 336 P.2d 937 (1959)
(denying hybrid of rights even though the constitution uses the con-junctive). The following cases are to the same effect even though the
state constitutions granted both rights: Holloway v. State, 43 Ala. App.
153, 182 So. 2d 906 (1965) (refusing to permit defendant to join in ap-
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B. PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS AFFECTING TE RIGHT
The classical definition of waiver is "an intentional re-
linquishment or abandonment of a uiown right or privilege."5 2
When the right involved is fundamental in nature and constitu-
tional in origin, courts are to indulge in every reasonable pre-
sumption that a waiver did not occur.53 For example, the state
must notify the defendant of his right to counsel before a valid
waiver can be found to have been made.54
It might be argued that specifically informing a defendant
of his right to counsel constitutes notice of his right to waive
counsel. But if the right to proceed. pro se is "correlative" to
the right to proceed with counsel,55 and if it is "inherent"5 6 and
"unqualified,"57 then it would certainly seem that the defend-
ant should have express notice. Implied notice of the right to
waive counsel should suffice only if the right is inferior to the
right to counsel.58
The Second Circuit, however, has indicated that the
rights are of different magnitude by holding that notice is not
constitutionally required.59 It has, nevertheless, suggested that
the following advice be given by trial judges: (1) that the de-
fendant has a choice of proceeding with or without counsel; (2)
that if the defendant desires the assistance of counsel, but can-
not afford to retain one, the court will make an appointment;
(3) that the defendant has a reasonable time to make the
peal); Powell v. State, 206 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 1968); Leahy v. State, 111
Tex. Crim. 570, 13 S.W.2d 874 (1928) (refusing to permit defendants to
cross examine witnesses); Ward v. State, 427 S.W.2d 876 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1968) (refusing to permit defendant to argue to jury).
52. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
53. Id.
54. See Swenson v. Bosler, 386 U.S. 258 (1967); Doughty v. Max-
well, 376 U.S. 202 (1964), rev'g per curiam, 175 Ohio St. 46, 191
N.E.2d 727 (1963), on the basis of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963), and Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962). See also Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
55. See Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279
(1942).
56. See Coleman v. Smyth, 166 F. Supp. 934, 937 (E.D. Va.),
appeal dismissed, 260 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S.
946 (1959).
57. See United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12, 15
(2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, DiBlasi v. McMann, 384 U.S. 1007 (1966).
58. If the right to proceed pro se is not treated as having a consti-
tutional basis, there is no problem in requiring the defendant to make a
clear request and in denying him the right to notice. E.g., Brown v.
United States, 264 F.2d 363 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 911 (1959).
59, United States v, Plattner, 330 F.2d 271, 276 (2d Cir, 1964).
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choice, and (4) that it is advisable to proceed with a lawyer be-
cause of his special skill and training.60
Since the warnings are not constitutionally required, the
question arises why they should be given at all. One reason
given is that notice helps to prevent defendants who are adept
at manipulating the right to counsel in order to confuse trial
records from claiming an infringement of their rights after con-
viction. 61 For example, a defendant may create a pre-trial rec-
ord of disagreement and disaffection with counsel and assert
after conviction that he was denied the right to proceed pro se.6 2
Or, if a request to discharge counsel is granted, the defendant
may claim that he was denied the assistance of counsel by being
forced to proceed pro se.63 This claim may succeed if in asking
to discharge counsel the defendant never clearly expressed a de-
sire to proceed pro se.64
These problems are not likely to be resolved by the warnings
suggested in Plattner, however, since they are given prior to an
appointment of counsel. The court seems to feel that notice of a
choice between two alternatives would help clarify a record in
which the defendant's desires are unclear,65 but if this is so-
and it is not clear why it should be so-the warnings would have
to be repeated whenever disaffection with counsel is expressed,
60. Id. at 276. See also United States v. Abbamonte, 348 F.2d
700 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 982 (1966).
61. 330 F.2d at 276. See also State v. Bullock, 71 Wash. 2d 886,
431 P.2d 195 (1967).
62. In United States v. Abbamonte, 348 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 982 (1966), the defendant accepted appointed
counsel before pleading not guilty. He then retained his own counsel,
but asked for and was granted a discharge of this lawyer before trial.
He again retained counsel, and then wanted to discharge him. The trialjudge relieved the attorney as retained counsel but immediately desig-
nated him appointed counsel and proceeded with trial.
63. In United States ex rel. Davis v. McMann, 386 F.2d 611 (2d
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 958 (1968), defendant discharged his re-
tained counsel after the jury had been impaneled. After three continu-
ances within one week in which defendant failed to retain other counsel
while simultaneously declining appointed counsel, the defendant was
ordered to trial without counsel.
64. See id. In United States eX Tel. Higgins v. Fay, 364 F.2d 219
(2d Cir. 1966), the defendant, after the trial had begun, asked to dis-
charge the legal aid attorney and be granted a continuance to hire an
attorney. On being given the choice of continuing with the attorney
or proceeding pro se, the defendant only insisted that he wanted another
lawyer. The trial judge discharged the lawyer. The court held that
the defendant had not waived the right to counsel.
65. See, e.g., United States v. Abbamonte, discussed in note 62
supra where it was implied that defendant's intention would have been
clearer if the Plattner procedure were followed.
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and they would have to delineate a clear choice between follow-
ing counsel's advice and proceeding pro se.
In some instances, the right to proceed pro se is denied even
after a request.0 6 This may result from a judge's fear that the
defendant will later assert that he was denied counsel, espe-
cially if the defendant's statements and requests have been am-
biguous. In such cases, some courts deny post-conviction relief
if the defendant fails to show that he was prejudiced by being
forced to proceed with counsel. 67 The Second Circuit has equivo-
cated on the issue. In the Plattner case, relief was granted
without requiring prejudice to be shown,68 but in a subsequent
case, where it was not clear that defendant wanted to proceed
pro se, the court disposed of any doubts by noting that in any
event the appointment had helped rather than hurt the de-
fendant.6 9
At least one court has correctly seen that if prejudice must
be a prerequisite to reversal, the right to proceed pro se is mean-
ingless:
It is difficult for a person trained in the law to conclude that one
unschooled in the legal arts is better able to present his defense
than could an able counsel. Even were we to concede that the
exceptional defendant, unschooled in -the broad spectrum of the
law, could conduct as able a defense ia his own behalf as quali-
fied counsel could do, it nears if not reaches the unimaginable
to say that a refusal to permit a lay defendant to proceed in
propia persona would have prejudiced him.70
66. Whenever counsel is denied to a defendant who does make a
request, the conviction is reversed without requiring a showing of preju-
dice: "The right to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and
absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount
of prejudice arising from its denial." Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S.
60, 76 (1942).
67. See, e.g., People v. Nelson, 87 l. App. 2d 159, 231 N.E.2d 115
(1967), rev'd in part and aff'd in part, 41 Ill. 2d 364, 243 N.E.2d 225
(1968) (right was asserted after trial had begun). See also Mayberry
v. Weinrott, 255 F. Supp. 80 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (suit under Civil Rights
Act to enjoin state trial judge from forcing attorney on defendant;
held, there has been no denial of a fundamental right until prejudice
is shown after the trial is over).
68. 330 F.2d at 273.
69. United States v. Abbamonte, discussed in note 62 supra. Again
it should be seen that if the right is not considered to have a con-
stitutional basis, there is no problem i requiring prejudice to be
shown. See Butler v. United States, 317 F.2d 249 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, Benedec v. United States, 375 U.S. 836 (1963); Brown v. United
States, 264 F.2d 363 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 911 (1959).
70. People v. Ruiz, 263 Cal. App. 2d 216, 226, 69 Cal. Rptr. 473,
479 (1968).
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C. Aw ANALOGY TO THE RIGHT TO WAIVE JuRY TRIAL
The foregoing discussion has shown that the right to proceed
pro se is limited in scope and effect. Notice of the right is not
required, and the right may be enjoyed only after a clear re-
quest. The right may be denied completely if it is not claimed
before trial, and, in any event, denial may mandate reversal of
a conviction only when prejudice is proved.
It is thus clear that the right is debilitated. It is time to
ask why trial judges must continue to "navigate adroitly be-
tween the Scylla of denying a defendant the right to determine
his own fate and the Charybdis of violating his right to counsel
by acceptance of an ineffectual waiver .... ,,71 It is time to
question the necessity of burdening the criminal justice system
with post-conviction proceedings growing out of the trial judge's
lack of this navigational skill. The first inquiry must be into
the right's constitutional underpinning, if any. The Supreme
Court's decision on the right to waive a jury trial provides a use-
ful starting point.
1. The Singer Case
In Singer v. United States,72 the petitioner questioned the
constitutional validity of rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which permits a waiver of jury trial only
with the acquiescence of the court and prosecutor. The Court
rejected the petitioner's argument by concluding that "[t]he
ability to waive a constitutional right does not ordinarily carry
with it the right to insist upon the opposite of that right."7 3
Hence, the petitioner had the ability to waive trial by jury,7 4
but he did not have the right to do so.
More important than the holding itself is the reasoning of
the Court. The petitioner had argued that the right to a jury
trial under common law and in colonial practice encompassed
a right of waiver. He had also argued that due process requires
that a defendant be permitted to waive constitutional privileges
that prove harmful to him. The Court reviewed common law
and colonial practice and found that neither supported a right
to waive trial by jury. In England, the defendant may have had
such a right in a minor offense case, but the Court rejected the
71. People v. Carter, 66 Cal. 2d 666, 667, 427 P.2d 214, 216, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 614, 616 (1967).
72. 380 U.S. 24 (1965).
73. Id. at 34-35 (emphasis added).
74. See Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930).
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notion that the "obscure and insignificant procedure" in these
cases established the proposition "that at common law defend-
ants had the right to choose the method of trial in all criminal
cases." 75 The Court also viewed any right of waiver that may
have existed in the colonies as a clear departure from common
law procedure. 76
In disposing of the petitioner's due process argument, the
Court noted the importance of the jury as a fact-finding body
both in criminal cases and in American tradition in general.77
Although acknowledging that trial by jury does have a potential
for misuse which can work to the prejudice of the defendant,
the Court carefully pointed out that procedural safeguards, such
as a change of venue and voir dire, helped to negate any abuse.71
In the case at hand, the petitioner had been given a trial by an
impartial jury, the very thing that the Constitution guaranteed.
With the defendant's interests so protected, the Court was able
to respect the Government's interest in forcing a jury trial on
the defendant: "[T] he government, as a litigant, has a legitimate
interest in seeing that cases in which it believes a conviction is
warranted are tried before the tribunal which the Constitution
regards as most likely to produce a fair result. '79
2. The Singer Reasoning Applied
a. The Common Law Practice
Unlike the "obscure and insignilicant procedure" of jury
waiver, there is no doubt that defend ants were able to assume
their own defense at common law. The importance of this factor,
however, can be determined only after comparing common law
with modern procedure.80
In sixteenth and early seventeenth century England, the de-
fendant did not have the right to be assisted by counsel. The
practice was for the accused to proceed alone.81 The defendant
75. 380 U.S. at 28.
76. Id. at 26.
77. Id. at 34.
78. Id. at 35.
79. Id. at 36.
80. Although most of the existing records of criminal trials of the
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries are of political crimes, the
procedure followed in those cases was probably typical of that in all
criminal trials. See 1 J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIANAL LAW
OF ENGLAND 345-50 (1883) [hereinafter cited as STEPHEN].
81. See W. BEANY, THE RIGHT TO CouNsEL IN AMIcAN COURTs
8-12 (1955); J. GRANT, OuR COMMON LAW CONSTITUTION 5-9 (1960)
[hereinafter cited as BxANY and GRANT, respectively]; STEPHEN, supra
note 80, at 341.
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was often interrogated before trial, by torture if need be. 2 The
trial began with the prosecutor's opening speech. The prisoner,
who had to answer to the matters alleged in the speech, usually
requested that he be allowed to answer separately to each mat-
ter as it was alleged. Thus, the trial involved a verbal battle
between the prosecutor and the defendant. The prosecutor's
statements often took the form of questions. If the prisoner
denied any matter, the prosecutor had to prove it; when the
proof consisted of the testimony of witnesses, the defendant was
permitted to ask them questions and to follow their testimony
with a statement of his own.8 3 As the famous trial of Sir Walter
Raleigh in 1603 reveals, however, the defendant had no right to
call witnesses to testify on his behalf, even if their testimony
might have acquitted him.8 4 In short, the defendant's position
was one of standing alone without counsel, books, the means of
procuring evidence or the right to offer evidence which he did
possess.80
The procedure started to change in the late seventeenth cen-
tury. After a statute was passed allowing counsel in cases of
treason,80 courts began to permit counsel to represent accused
felons.8 7 During this period, the questioning of the accused at
trial was reduced in significance and more reliance was placed
on witnesses' testimony.85 Nevertheless, the accused's only real
hope of acquittal was his own persuasiveness; although given
the right to present witnesses, he was not given the means to
send for them. 9 Moreover, counsel were not yet adept at the
art of cross-examination.90
While the practice of proceeding pro se existed at common
law, it is difficult to state that such a -right existed. Of course,
the practice in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries may have
been tantamount to a right, for if the accused could not have
defended himself, there would have been no adversary trial at
82. GRANT, supra note 81, at 10-14; STEPHEN, supra note 80, at 335.
83. STEPHEN, supra note 80, at 325-27.
84. GRANT, supra note 81, at 2-5; STEPHEN, supra note 80, at 335.
85. STEPHEN, supra note 80, at 350.
86. The statute, 7 & 8 Will. 3, c.3, was passed in 1695; id. at 416.
87. Id. at 424. Even as late as the 1750's, however, there was uncer-
tainty as to what counsel could do; see GRANT, supra note 81, at 8.
Prior to 1750, when counsel was permitted, his role was limited to
handling purely legal questions. It is likely that counsel's expanded
role in the eighteenth century grew out of an extended definition of the
term "legal." BEANY, supra note 81, at 10.
88. STEPHEN, supra note 80, at 358, 377.
89. Id. at 388, 440.
90. Id. at 417.
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all. The courts, however, never spoke of a right to proceed pro
se.91 This is not surprising since the right to retain counsel
was not fixed by statute until 1836.92
In comparison with the common law practice whereby the
defendant proceeded pro se, modern procedure is drastically dif-
ferent. Strict rules protect the defendant from convicting him-
self by involuntary pre-trial statements. The defendant goes
to trial with a presumption of innocence93 and he has a right
to remain silent while the state attempts to meet the heavy
burden of proof required for conviction. Counsel for the ac-
cused is armed with liberal rules to challenge evidence, is given
process to send for witnesses, and is trained in the art of cross-
examination. No longer does the trial revolve around the de-
fendant; the defendant may, if he chooses, sit back and watch the
trial unfold as he would a play, and he may be acquitted.
In light of today's procedure, what is the significance of the
common law practice of proceeding pro se? Unlike the "ob-
scure and insignificant" common law practice of jury waiver,
the practice of proceeding pro se was clearly established. But
the irrelevance of that practice to today's greatly changed and
enlightened procedure is clear. Since none of the procedure with
which the practice of proceeding pro se was so inextricably inter-
twined has survived, the practice at common law should not be
determinative of the issue today.
b. Early American Experience
The early American practice adds no more to a solution of
91. It is interesting to note that the evidence from the nineteenth
century indicates that if the accused retained counsel, his right to par-
ticipate in conducting his defense was curtailed. See Rex v. Parkins,
171 Eng. Rep. 1311 (K.B. 1824); Rex v. White, 13 Rev. Rep. 765 (1811).
The justification given for the limitation was the same as that used by
American courts today: "I am afraid of the confusion and perplexity
which would necessarily arise, if a cause were to be conducted at the
same time both by counsel and by the party himself." Rex v. White,
supra, at 766. But cf. Regina v. Doherty, 16 Cox Crim. Cas. 306, 310
(1887) where Stephen, as judge, asserted that the act permitting coun-
sel was not intended to take away the defendant's right to address the
jury.
92. The right to appointed counsel was not fixed by statute until
1903, BEANY, supra note 81, at 12. In Regina v. Yscuado, 6 Cox Crim.
Cas. 386 (1854), the prosecutor suggested that counsel be appointed
because of the "peculiar circumstances" of the case. The judge re-
sponded that he had no power to appoint counsel without the defendant's
consent, id. at 387.
93. This presumption did not exist in early common law years.
SmFrmw, supra note 80, at 355.
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the issue than does the English practice. Due to a shortage of
lawyers in the colonies, it is reasonable to conclude that most
defendants represented themselves before the courts. The col-
onies did, however, seem to place more emphasis on the role of
counsel. Several of the colonies established a statutory right
to counsel and Connecticut developed the practice of appointing
counsel.94
Some of the statutory provisions of the late seventeenth and
early eighteenth centuries provided that a defendant could plead
his case by counsel. Others were interpreted to mean that coun-
sel's role was no greater than that in the earlier English practice
and thus, in these colonies, counsel could only argue points of law.
In any event, the studies made to date do not indicate the extent
to which counsel was utilized by defendants.9 5 After 1776, many
state constitutions granted the right to counsel and many of
these included the right of the accused to be heard by himself.96
Subsequent state constitutions were similar.97
The first American cases dealing with the effect of counsel
on the accused's right to conduct his defense arose, as in Eng-
land, over the question of both the defendant and counsel par-
ticipating. In the states, the problem was more acute because
specific provisions in the constitutions granted the defendant
the right to be heard by himself. The courts were not, however,
to be deterred from maintaining order.98 Perhaps the best state-
ment interpreting such a provision is found in Wilson V. State:99
That provision was founded upon a profound knowledge of hu-
man nature, and a close and careful observation of human trans-
actions. An innocent person is sometimes entangled in a web
of suspicion by a curious combination of facts, which no one else
can explain but himself.... The skill or eloquence of his
counsel can not reconcile the facts proven with the hypothesis
of innocence. He alone may be possessed of the clue. He
alone may be able by a simple explanation of circumstances...
or by putting this and that fact together, to remove every
shadow of suspicion from himself. 100
The court held that although the defendant had no right to be
94. BnaNY, supra note 81, at 14-18.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 18-22.
97. See text accompanying note 23 supra.
98. See, e.g., State v. McCall, 4 Ala. 643 (1848) (defendant not
permitted to make statement of facts to the jury); Leahy v. State, 111
Tex. Crim. 570, 13 S.W.2d 874 (1928) (defendant not permitted to cross-
examine witnesses although constitution gave right to be heard by him-
self or counsel or both).
99. 50 Tenn. 232 (1871).
100. Id. at 241.
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sworn as a witness' 01 or to introduce facts by an unsworn state-
ment, the state constitution sought to guarantee "to every pris-
oner the right to explain the case made against him, in his own
way."'10 2 In other words, the state constitution was aimed at
insuring that the right to counsel did not deprive the accused
of the right to explain the circumstances, because he, and no one
else, might be best qualified for this task. The defendant was
to be guaranteed what was vital to him at common law and in
the colonies-the right to argue against the state's case.
The need for permitting the defendant to make a separate
statement to the jury no longer exists because the defendant is
now permitted to be a witness. 10 3 Not only can he explain the
evidence produced by the prosecutor, but he may introduce new
facts. Hence, it convincingly can be contended that permitting
an accused to testify satisfies the concerns expressed by the
early Americans who wrote the state constitutions. Likewise,
permitting the accused to testify satisfies whatever the writers
of the sixth amendment may have been taking for granted. 0 4
In any event, there is no evidence that anyone considered the
issue of the accused being able to waive counsel and conduct his
entire defense himself. The right to counsel itself received little
attention from the constitution's authors. 0 5 It strains credulity
to assert that a people who would have been shocked by Johnson
v. Zerbst and Gideon v. Wainwright really considered the right
to reject counsel. 10 6 .
c. The Government Interest and Due Process
The Singer Court referred to the government's interest in
having cases tried by the method most likely to produce a fair
result. One basis of this interest is the responsibility of the gov-
ernment to procure convictions. A second vital basis, however,
is its responsibility to see that its innocent citizens are not made
101. Until 1853, parties in England were incompetent as witnesses,
but this was qualified in criminal cases because of the absence of coun-
sel. STEPHEN, supra note 80, at 440. The Wilson case suggests that in
the United States the rule was to protect the defendant from cross-
examination which was thought to violate the privilege against self-
incrimination.
102. 50 Tenn. at 242 (emphasis added).
103. See, e.g., State v. Townley, 149 Minn. 5, 182 N.W. 773 (1921).
104. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
105. BEAxY, supra note 81, at 22-24, 27.
106. See BEANY, supra note 81, at 27-36, arguing that the Johnson
Court ignored history in finding that the sixth amendment required ap-
pointment of counsel.
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to suffer.107 Even though the criminal trial is an adversary
proceeding, the government is not simply a combatant trying to
win. When the government invokes its criminal process, it is
utilizing its most powerful weapons against the citizen. It owes
him the obligation of guaranteeing that this weaponry will not
deprive him of his cherished rights and liberties until it is deter-
mined by a just and fair process that he has broken its valid
law.108
There can be no doubt that for most, if not all, cases the
fairest trial procedure is one in which counsel represents the ac-
cused. The long struggle from the old common law procedure
to the overruling of Betts v. Brady'0 9 in Gideon'" is testimony
to this fact. Suffice it to repeat Justice Sutherland's classic
statement:
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and some-
times no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he
is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the
indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of
evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on
trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent
evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inad-
missible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately
to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one....
If that be true of men of intelligence, how much more true is it
of the ignorant and illiterate, or those of feeble intellect.",
If the presence of counsel is deemed necessary to assure a
fair trial in a particular case, the government (the court or the
prosecutor) should have the power to reject a waiver of counsel
even from a mentally competent defendant. This view, however,
runs counter to the Second Circuit's reading of due process re-
quiring that an accused be allowed to harm himself so that he
can claim to have gone down under his own banner." 2 If the
accused is to lose his freedom-or his life-perhaps it should be
by the process that seems fairest to him. Such a subjective
107. 380 U.S. at 36-37.
108. Cf. REPORT or THE ATTORNEY GENERA'S COmITTEE ON PovERTY
AND THE ADMASTRATION OF CRIMIAL JUSTICE 9 (1963):
When government chooses to exert its powers in the criminal
area, its obligation is surely no less than that of taking reason-
able measures to eliminate those factors that are irrelevant tojust administration of law but which, nevertheless, may oc-
casionally affect determinations of the accused's liability or
penalty.
109. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
110. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
111. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
112. See text accompanying notes 23-25 supra.
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approach might even be to society's interest in that it would
make easier the rehabilitative goals of penology.
Nevertheless, it seems that there are government interests
more important than the interest in protecting individual auton-
omy or in guaranteeing a trial that is subjectively fair. First,
it should be remembered that Singer contended that a jury trial
was not the most advantageous procedure for him, but the Su-
preme Court upheld the government's interest in utilizing the
procedure deemed fairest by objective standards. 1 3 Second, the
government has interests that extend beyond the accused. A
strong and just government must supervise and restrict its own
behavior to assure its continued strength and popular support,
which depend, to some extent, on protecting the security of the
rest of the members of the community. This security is main-
tained only if the community is convinced that the government
will not deprive anyone of his rights except by methods objec-
tively fair. Therefore, the government must have the right to
demand that it not deviate from certain standards, even if the
individual proceeded against would see no transgression. 1 4
An issue of this nature can evoke strong sentiments on both
sides and collateral considerations thus become relevant. One
consideration is the interest of achieving finality in criminal ad-
judications. Needless post-conviction maneuvers are, of course,
counterproductive. Under the existing rules, skillful defendants
can manipulate the right to counsel and the right to proceed
pro se in such a manner as to preserve a post-conviction attack
regardless of the trial judge's decision.
The issue is not fully resolved, however. The Second Cir-
cuit recognized two due process arguments in support of a right
to proceed pro se. Besides respecting the right of the accused
to go down under his own banner, the court expressed the con-
cern that the accused would not be able to present his best de-
fense if he were forced to trial with counsel in whom he had no
confidence." 5 Although it was argued above that a lawyer is
113. 380 U.S. at 36.
114. Cf. REPORT OF TEE ATiroRNmL GENERAL, supra note 108, at 10:
In the modern era it is not always fully understood that the
adversary system performs a vital social function and is the
product of long historical experience. The state trials in six-
teenth- and seventeenth-century England demonstrated that a
system of justice that provides inadequate opportunities to chal-
lenge official decisions is not only productive of injuries to
individuals, but is itself a threat to 'the state's security and to
the larger interests of the community.
115. See discussion at text accompanying notes 24-25 supra.
1196 [Vol. 54:1175
THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
necessary to assure the presentation of the best defense avail-
able, a closer examination of this conclusion is necessary in sit-
uations involving appointed counsel or public defenders who
have more cases than they can handle and who may spend little
time preparing for trial. If, in general, this representation is of
extremely poor quality, it is difficult to justify denying an in-
digent the opportunity to represent himself. Of course, one
might argue that if the representation received is of poor quality,
the solution is to remedy the defect rather than to allow the ac-
cused to try presenting a better defense on his own. Unfor-
tunately, however, an immediate remedy is not available to cor-
rect inadequate representation on a large scale; at most, the legal
remedy of reversal for ineffective assistance of counsel is work-
able only if such representation is the exception rather than the
rule.11 6
All studies of appointed counsel rely largely on interviews
with judges and prosecutors and on the analysis of results ac-
tually achieved by counsel. The conclusions vary, as should be
expected from research methods based on subjective opinions
and on "outcome" results which may be affected by a myriad of
variables. On the one hand, it has been said: "Personal observa-
tions and interviews with several attorneys active in represent-
ing indigents confirm the fact that efforts of assigned counsel
are occasionally perfunctory, often uninspired; lack of experience
is widespread and cannot help but reduce the effectivensss of
counsel in some measure."' 17 It should be noted, however, that
a major concern of the scholars is the frequency with which
indigents with appointed lawyers plead guilty. There is evi-
dence to suggest that such defendants plead guilty more fre-
quently than defendants with retained counsel," s although it is
also clear that those without attorneys are even more likely to
plead guilty." 9 The issue here, however, is whether those who
go to trial with appointed counsel get inadequate representation.
116. The Singer Court emphasized the presence of surrounding
safeguards to counteract the potential for prejudice in cases involving
mandatory jury trials. Similarly, safeguards must be established if
forced representation is to be allowed. The doctrine of ineffective as-
sistance of counsel, the major safeguard in this area, is discussed in
section IV infra.
117. Note, The Representation of Indigent Criminal Defendants in
the Federal District Courts, 76 HARV. L. REV. 579, 613 (1963).
118. Id. at 588; L. SILVERSTEiN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR IN CRfMNAL
CASES n AEaIcAN STATE CouTs 21 (1965).
119. Mazor, The Right to be Provided Counsel: Variations on a
Familiar Theme, 9 UTAH L. REV. 50, 86 (1964).
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There is evidence that cases with retained lawyers take a
longer period of time, but there also is evidence that this repre-
sents dilatory tactics rather than greater work.12  The statistics
do show, however, that the conviction rate and the rate of con-
viction on the original charge, as opposed to a reduced charge,
decrease in direct correlation to the increase in the time taken
to complete a case.12 1 There also is evidence to indicate that as-
signed counsel are younger and less experienced than most re-
tained attorneys. 22 It also has been suggested that a position
in the public defender's office is used to obtain experience for a
more lucrative position. 23 Perhaps, however, the soundest and
safest conclusion is the following:
About all that can safely be said is that assigned counsel have a
somewhat inferior record, but the difference is not so great
that one can ascribe it to assigned counsel systems as such.
Other factors may again be at work, such as the availability of
funds for investigation, the method of selecting assigned coun-
sel, and, most of all, the poverty of the defendant himself and
his lack of standing in the community. 12 4
Factors other than method of selection would also be
present to hinder a defendant without counsel. Therefore,
on the basis of studies so far made, it can be said that indigents
may not get the quality of representation they should; but the
quality is not poor enough to necessitate the conclusion that due
process requires that an accused be given an absolute right to
waive counsel.
D. THAT DUE PROCESS CAN REQUIRE FORCING AN ACCUSED
TO BE REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL
Up to this point the only conclusion is that the approach of
the Second Circuit and of other courts following its reasoning
is incorrect, and that neither the sixth amendment nor due proc-
ess is violated by forcing an accused to be represented by coun-
sel. This conclusion nevertheless leaves the courts free to accept
a waiver of counsel and to allow the accused to proceed pro se.
The discussion, however, suggests the possibility that if particu-
lar circumstances justify the court's rejection of a waiver of
counsel, the same circumstances may require forced representa-
120. Banfield & Anderson, Continuances in the Cook County Crimi-
nal Courts, 35U. CHi. L. REv. 259, 279-82 (1968).
121. Id. at 283-87.
122. Mazor, supra note 119, at 83; L. SmvasTzI, supra note 118,
at 16.
123. L. SI wusrZIN, supra note 118, at 44.
124. Id. at 28.
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tion. A consideration of the pre-Gideon right to counsel cases
can shed light on the contention that there are at least some cir-
cumstances in which the court must reject a waiver of counsel.
Betts v. Brady125 established an approach to the right to
counsel issue in state courts that was not abandoned for 20
years. Betts held that the sixth amendment right to counsel was
not binding on the states, but it also stated that this right was a
factor to consider in determining whether the defendant had
been given due process: "the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits
the conviction and incarceration of one whose trial is offensive to
the common and fundamental ideas of fairness and right, and...
want of counsel in a particular case may result in a conviction
lacking in such fundamental fairness .... ,,12 In the years fol-
lowing Betts, the Court had many opportunities to deal with the
issue of what constituted "special circumstances" requiring coun-
sel in a particular case. Some of the factors that played a sig-
nificant role in many of the cases were summarized by the Court
in Wade v. Mayo:12 7 "There are some individuals who, by reason
of age, ignorance or mental capacity are incapable of represent-
ing themselves adequately in a prosecution of a relatively simple
nature. -1 2 8  In addition, the Court occasionally considered the
complexity of the legal questions involved'29 and examined the
trial record for significant injustices during trial.130
Although Betts and its progeny were concerned with the
fourteenth amendment and not the sixth amendment,131 it is
clear that the Court was of the view that the deficiency in due
process created by denying the right to counsel was cured by a
125. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
126. Id. at 473.
127. 334 U.S. 672 (1948).
128. Id. at 684.
129. See, e.g., Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962) (statutory
construction in crime of incestuous sexual intercourse); McNeal v.
Culver, 365 U.S. 109 (1961) (possible lesser included offenses and
question of admissibility of statement); Cash v. Culver, 358 U.S.
633 (1959) (right to cross-examine accomplice as to reasons for testi-
fying); Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957) (technical difficulties
in defenses to murder); Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786 (1945) (question
of jurisdiction on Indian reservations).
130. See, e.g., Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773, 781 (1949), where the
court found that hearsay and other incompetent evidence was ad-
mitted without objection and that unnecessary and unfavorable court
rulings resulted in defendant being "handicapped by lack of counsel
to such an extent that his constitutional right to a fair trial was de-
nied."
131. Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 660 (1948).
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valid waiver.132 It is not at all clear, however, why a waiver
had this effect. The absurdity of the conclusion is highlighted
by McNeal v. Culver'3 3 in which an kadigent, ignorant and men-
tally ill defendant was charged with assault with intent to mur-
der. State assault law was extremely complex and it was pos-
sible that the petitioner might have been guilty only of aggra-
vated assault, a crime carrying 15 years less punishment. The
trial record revealed that the petitioner was incapable of cross-
examining witnesses or otherwise presenting his defense. The
Court found special circumstances requiring the assistance of
counsel: "These facts tend strongly to show that petitioner's ig-
norance, coupled with his mental illness and complete unfamil-
iarity with the law and court procedures, and the scant, if any,
help he received from the court, made the trial fundamentally
unfair."1 34 It is hard to accept the view that a waiver of counsel
renders these factors irrelevant. Had McNeal waived counsel,
he still would have been ignorant, mentally ill and unable to
manage his defense, and his trial would have been just as "fun-
damentally unfair."
In one case, the Supreme Court seems to have recognized
that counsel's presence was absolutely necessary to a fair trial.
In Massey v. Moore,135 the petitioner asserted that he was denied
due process because he was tried while of unsound mind and
unassisted by counsel. The Court noted that a defendant might
be capable of standing trial but incapable of proceeding without
counsel:
No trial can be fair that leaves the defense to a man who is in-
sane, unaided by counsel, and who by reason of his mental con-
dition stands helpless and alone before the court. Even the
sane layman may have difficulty discovering in a particular
case the defenses which the law allows.... Yet problems
difficult for him are impossible for the insane.136
The words of the Court seem to refute the idea that a mentally
incompetent defendant is prohibited from waiving counsel
merely because of his inability to meet the strict waiver require-
ments of Johnson v. Zerbst;137 rather, it is clear that a fair trial is
132. Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957); Uveges v. Pennsyl-
vania, 335 U.S. 437 (1948); Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948).
133. 365 U.S. 109 (1961).
134. Id. at 114.
135. 348 U.S. 105 (1954).
136. Id. at 108-09 (emphasis added).
137. 304 U.S. at 464. Waiver was defined as the "intentional re-
linquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege."
L[Vol. 54:11'751200
THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
impossible for an unrepresented defendant who is mentally in-
competent.
It would appear to follow that if an accused's ignorance or
lack of legal skill is extreme, a fair trial is closer to an impossi-
bility than to an improbability and a waiver of counsel should
not be permitted. McNeal's chances of obtaining a fair trial
were no greater than Massey's; a waiver of counsel would not
have prevented an unfair trial in either case.
Of course, it can be argued that since a defendant can plead
guilty without a violation of the constitution,1 38 there is nothing
unconstitutional in permitting him to go to trial and do virtually
nothing. It can also be argued, however, that if fairness is the
criterion, it is not proper to accept a guilty plea. Neither objec-
tion is logically necessary. As to the first, the fact is that the
defendant has pleaded not guilty. The government must prove
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and it should not be permitted
to carry its burden with unfair methods. For some defendants,
fundamental fairness cannot be achieved without counsel. A
trial such as that in McNeal or Massey makes meaningless the
traditional concept of a plea of not guilty.
The second objection poses a more serious problem. Would
it necessarily follow, for example, that because McNeal had a
chance of success at trial, the acceptance of a guilty plea would
have been unfair? The answer must be no, provided the guilty
plea process was fair. If this process is fair, it should not matter
that it would have been fairer yet to go to trial. The problem
in either mode of trial is only to assure that the proceedings are
fair. This may mean that counsel's presence should be required
before accepting a guilty plea' 39 and it may mean that the guilty
plea process should reveal that there is a factual basis for the
plea.140 Whatever is needed to assure a fair guilty plea process,
the fact remains that certain trials without counsel simply are
not fair determinations of guilt.
138. In Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 305 (1930), the peti-
tioner claimed that the right of jury trial was too basic to be waived.
The Court stated:
It is difficult to see why the fact . . . that the accused may
plead guilty and thus dispense with a trial altogether, does
not effectively disclose the fallacy of the public policy conten-
tion; for if the state may interpose the claim of public interest
between the accused and his desire to waive a jury trial,
a fortiori it should be able to interpose a like claim between
him and his determination to avoid any form of trial by ad-
mitting his guilt.
139. See subsection E2 infra.
140. See section IV, subsection E infra.
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The recommended approach would not seriously disturb
other areas of the criminal process. For example, if it is unfair
to try a defendant without bringing him into court, is it unfair
to proceed when he voluntarily absents himself? The present
doctrine that the trial may continue would remain good law,
provided counsel is present.1 41 When the accused with counsel
stays away from trial, he denies himself the opportunity of being
personally present; he does not deny himself a fair trial. The
waiver doctrine is valid provided the process which determines
guilt remains fair. In right to counsel cases, the time has come
to recognize that fundamental unfairness results not only from
being denied the opportunity to have counsel, but also from
being found guilty in a waiver-of-counsel case in which the de-
fendant is utterly lacking in legal acumen.
The Supreme Court, however, has not shown an inclination
to adopt the rule that due process can require forcing an accused
to be represented by counsel. United States v. Wade held that
the sixth amendment right to counsel applies to pre-trial lineups
by reasoning that counsel's presence is necessary to assure a fair
trial: "In sum the principle of Powell v. Alabama and succeeding
cases requires that we . . determine whether the presence of
his counsel is necessary to preserve the defendant's basic right
to a fair trial .... ,,142 Nevertheless, the Court stated that
counsel could be waived.143
In view of the Supreme Court's continued support of a rule
of waiver, the approach recommended here would require the
Court to reconsider its reasoning. It should at least be plain
that cases like Wade are really stating that the right to a fair
trial can be waived. 44 If the Court is saying that due process
only guarantees an opportunity to E fair trial, but not a fair
trial itself, it should say so directly. It does not, however, seem
141. Although counsel's presence is not mentioned as a factor in
the cases, the facts often reveal that counsel continued the trial after
the accused remained away. See, e.g., United States v. Grow, 394 F.2d
182 (3d Cir. 1968); Pearson v. United States, 325 F.2d 625 (D.C. Cir.
1963). Of course, if counsel was not present, the proceedings, under
the recommended approach, would not be fair. If counsel's presence
is required in all cases going to trial (see section E infra), no trial
in progress could be frustrated by defendant's voluntary absence.
142. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
143. Id. at 237.
144. See also O'Brien v. United States, 376 F.2d 538 (1st Cir. 1967),
vacated on other grounds, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); Minor v. United States,
375 F.2d 170 (8th Cir.), cerr. denied, 389 U.S. 882 (1967) (waiver of
counsel waives trial defects). But cf. Note, The Supreme Court, 1966
Term, 81 HARv. L. Rnv. 110, 178 (1967).
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that the Court would come to such a conclusion. The accused
may as well be entitled to waive the entire judicial process and
submit to punishment by his captors if he can validly submit
himself to a trial completely devoid of fairness. The better ap-
proach is to recognize that constitutional rights are waivable
only when a fair trial is possible without them.145 A fair trial
should not be waivable, and therefore, in some cases, like Mc-
Neal, due process should prohibit waiver of counsel.
At least one federal court has agreed that the due process
right to counsel is distinguishable from the sixth amendment
right. In Juelich v. United States 46 the Fifth Circuit held that
due process required the appointment of counsel at a motion to
vacate judgment even though the sixth amendment did not ap-
ply. The court then reacted to the claim of a right to proceed
pro se: "In such Fifth Amendment cases, it can hardly be argued
that there is any 'correlative right to dispense with a lawyer's
help' for that would imply the reductio ad absurdum that a hear-
ing not 'fair and meaningful' is a constitutionally protected
right."'147 The court was, of course, dealing with a claimed
right to proceed pro se, but it is almost as absurd to conclude
that a hearing "not fair and meaningful" is constitutionally per-
missible. Of course, the court's reasoning is equally applicable
to critical stages where the right to counsel does apply.
E. ADDING TE Coup DE GRACE TO WAIVER OF COUNSEL
1. At Trial
Up to this point two conclusions have been reached: (1) a
defendant has no right to demand that he proceed pro se, and (2)
due process requires that some defendants be prohibited from
waiving counsel. The consideration now is whether waiver of
counsel should be prohibited in all cases going to trial.
The second of the two conclusions poses serious problems for
the administration of criminal justice. Basically, it sets forth
the Betts "special circumstances" test, 48 but in the context of
prohibiting waiver of counsel rather than in the context of pro-
hibiting the denial of the right to counsel. Therefore, it can be
expected that the same procedural problems will accompany the
145. See Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269,
280 (1942).
146. 342 F.2d 29 (5th Cir. 1965).
147. Id. at 32.
148. See text accompanying notes 125-30 supra.
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rule in the new context as were present in the old. First, it
often is difficult for a trial judge to assess beforehand whether
the defendant is capable of assuring himself a fair trial. Second,
the final arbiter often is an appellate court. The long list of
cases dealt with by the Supreme Court during the reign of
Betts testifies to this problem.1 4 9  One can predict, therefore,
that the proposed rule would create a flood of post-trial attacks
alleging that because of age, ignorance, mental disease or the
complexity of the charges, waiver of counsel should not have
been accepted.
The only way to avoid the problems associated with the spe-
cial circumstances test is to insist that counsel be provided even
in cases where the defendant could manage to procure a fair
trial on his own. This would not place an intolerable burden
on the courts. In the state courts it has been estimated that an
average of 69 percent of all defendants plead guilty. 5 0 Thus, 31
percent of the cases are disposed of by a full trial, which in ab-
solute numbers for the year 1962 would have been 93,000 cases.'5 1
But studies show that very few of these defendants are without
counsel at the present time.1 52  In :many counties, between 90
and 100 percent of unrepresented defendants plead guilty, 5 3
thus leaving few full trials without counsel.
In the federal courts the burden -would be even less. A plea
of guilty or nolo contendere was entered in over 78 percent of
all cases in 1968.154 In absolute numbers, cases of 31,843 defend-
ants were disposed of in the federal courts, and 25,334 of these
were represented by appointed counsel.'55 Again, studies indi-
cate that few of those pleading not guilty are without counsel.'5 6
From the statistics, it can be seen that little added burden
would be placed on the system by prohibiting waiver of counsel
in all cases. Moreover, the added burden would be insignificant
compared to the burden that would be caused by applying a spe-
cial circumstances type test. And finally, interviews with fed-
eral judges and United States Attorneys reveal practically unan-
149. See text accompanying notes 125-36 and notes 129-30 supra.
150. L. SILVERSTEIN, supra note 118, at 9, reports that the figure
varies from 33 to 93 percent depending on the county.
151. Id. at 7.
152. Id. at 91.
153. Id. at 98-99, Table 29.
154. 1968 REP. Din. AD. OFF. U.S. Crs. 261. (Of this number over
50 percent were dismissed before a verdict).
155. Id. at 92, 261.
156. Note, supra note 117, at 585.
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imous opinion that trials without counsel have no commendable
features and often produce irrational results and error-filled rec-
ords.1' 7 There is no reason, therefore, for not extending the
rule to cover all cases going to trial.
2. Before Pleading
The statistics discussed above reveal that the vast majority
of all criminal defendants plead guilty; they also show that an
even greater majority of unrepresented defendants so plead. Al-
though it is difficult to determine the exact number of defend-
ants who are unrepresented, one study of 152 counties revealed
that in 62 of them at least 11 percent of the defendants lacked
counsel.Y5 8 In smaller counties the number was considerably
higher, surpassing 44 percent in counties with a median popula-
tion of 45,000.159 Therefore, it can be seen that in a system proc-
essing over 300,000 felony defendants a year,160 a proposal not
to accept a waiver of counsel in guilty plea cases would present
a large problem in cost and manpower. Only weighty consider-
ation could justify imposing such a burden on the system.
In terms of fairness, two interests weigh in favor of requir-
ing counsel's presence: (1) enabling the defendant to present
his best defense, and (2) enabling the defendant to benefit from
plea bargaining. Considering the first, it cannot be doubted
that only an attorney can discover and evaluate all of the de-
fenses to the charges. The pre-arraignment issues are many and
require the special skill only years of legal training can provide.
For example, motions to attack the indictment must be consid-
ered and these can be based on reasons as divergent as improper
selection of the grand jury and failure to charge an offense.
Defenses that often are not obvious to the layman, such as the
statute of limitations or double jeopardy, and motions to sup-
press evidence are always considerations.161 Counsel must also
assess the relative strength of the prosecution's case, taking into
account the legal merits of its theory, the convincing nature of
its evidence and the character of its witnesses. Circumstances
which might prejudice a trier of fact, such as the nature of the
157. Id.
158. L. SILVERsTEIN, supra note 118, at 91.
159. Id. at 97, Table 28.
160. Id. at 7.
161. See, A. AAmsTERDAm, B. SEGAL & M. MILLER, TRiAL MANuAL FOR
THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES §§ 172-84 (1967). At section 234




defense, the status of the complainant, community attitudes
and pre-trial publicity, must be made part of the picture.6 2 All
of these considerations are essential to an intelligent choice of
pleas, but it is doubtful that even an intelligent layman could
adequately assess their importance. The need for counsel is fur-
ther highlighted by the fact that most defendants are not intelli-
gent laymen.163 In fact, counsel's task is often to save the ac-
cused from himself: "Counsel's appraisal of the case is probably
far better than the defendant's, and often his difficult and pain-
ful job is to save the defendant from the defendant's ill-informed
or ill-estimated choices.' 64
If the first interest-that of enabling the defendant to pre-
sent his best defense-stood alone, it might yet be reasonable to
conclude that guilty pleas should be acceptable after a waiver
of counsel. It could be contended that a guilty defendant should
be encouraged to confess his crime and repent rather than to
attack the accusation with an armory of technicalities that bear
little or no relation to actual guilt. A number of important
values are served by guilty pleas: prompt and certain applica-
tion of correctional measures, lessening of court congestion, and
a manifestation by the defendant of a willingness to assume re-
sponsibility for his conduct. 65
The argument in favor of waiver would have merit if the
unrepresented defendant pleaded to the same offense as the de-
fendant with counsel, but this is not the case. A second interest
becomes relevant at this point. Plea bargaining must be recog-
nized as an integral part of the criminal justice process in the
United States,16 6 and those without counsel are denied the bene-
fits derived from it. One study showed that:
Of those [unrepresented defendants] who pleaded guilty, the
162. Id. at 202-04.
163. Potts, Right to Counsel in C'riminal Cases: Legal Aid or
Public Defender, 28 TEx. L. REv. 491 (1950); L. SiLvERsTEIN, supra note
118, at 7 (half of the 300,000 felony defendants in the state courts are
classified as indigents based on their inability to make bail).
164. A. AmsTERDAM, ET AL., supra note 161, § 201.
165. A.B.A. PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRMINAL Jus-
TICE: STANDARDS RELATING TO GuIiTY PrEAs 2 (Tentative Draft 1967).
166. Id. § 1.8, at 36-52. Since United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S.
570 (1968), there has been some concern that plea bargaining unneces-
sarily chills the fifth amendment right -to plead not guilty. The Jack-
son case, however, did note that guilty pleas are necessary for the ad-
ministration of the criminal process. For a discussion of the limited
circumstances in which plea bargaining may be considered as not un-
necessarily chilling the defendant's fifth amendment rights, see Scott v.
United States, 4 Crim. L. Rptr. 3101 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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overwhelming majority pleaded to the principle [sic] offense
rather than to a lesser offense. This suggests the possibility
that a defendant without counsel is in a poor position to bargain
with the prosecutor for a plea to a lesser offense.' 67
The question presented by this fact is whether our system
can tolerate the unequal justice afforded by permitting an ac-
cused to plead guilty without having had the benefit of counsel's
advice and assistance. It does not seem fair for a system with
a built-in mechanism of leniency to deny its benefits to an ac-
cused merely because he was too ignorant, arrogant or naive to
appreciate the need for counsel. In fact, according to current
ideology on differential sentencing, the accused who pleads
guilty after rejecting counsel's aid should be more entitled to
leniency than his represented counterpart, since the willingness
to repent is clearer when no plea bargaining has taken place."6
Yet the system apparently produces the opposite result.
To assure equal justice for all, therefore, the necessity of
counsel's presence before pleading should be recognized. Of
course, if the accused refuses to cooperate in any way with coun-
sel, the system has done all it can do. This refusal, however,
should be made in a private meeting between counsel and
the defendant outside of the courtroom setting; a rejection at the
time counsel is offered should not be accepted. This is the type
of justice that should be characteristic of American jurispru-
dence and nothing less should be acceptable unless it is found
to be impossible to overcome the cost and manpower problems
that presently deny a more equitable approach.169
F. SUMMATION
Some courts argue that a constitutional right to proceed pro
se is encompassed in the sixth amendment and in state constitu-
tions which grant a criminal defendant a right to be heard by
himself. The state constitutions, however, were probably di-
167. L. SLVERSTEn, supra note 118, at 91-93. See also Mazor,
supra note 119, at 91-93.
168. See A.B.A. PROJEcT, supra note 165, § 1.8, at 36-52 stating that a
willingness to acknowledge guilt is a factor to consider in sentencing.
169. In some states a guilty plea cannot be accepted in the absence
of counsel. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 15, § 262 (1959) (felonies); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1018 (West 1956) (felonies punishable by death or life
without eligibility for parole); ILL. REv. STAT. C. 38, § 113-5 (1965)
(persons under 18, unless punishable only by fine). See also Note,
Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromises by Prosecutors to Secure Guilty
Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 865 (1964), where the writer questions




rected at enabling the accused to "tell his side of the story." In
addition, neither the early state constitutions nor the common
law practice lend credence to the id.ea that the writers of the
sixth amendment intended a right to waive counsel. At any
rate these courts have so limited the right that little, if anything,
remains of it.
Furthermore, no due process underpinning to the "right"
can be found. In fact, due process requires a rule prohibiting
waiver in special circumstances. To avoid needless appellate ad-
judication, waiver should be prohibited in all cases going to trial.
Finally, although the burden would be considerable, it is recom-
mended that waiver of counsel be prohibited even in guilty plea
cases so that equal justice can be provided by the criminal justice
system.
III. WAIVING OBJECTIONS TO UNCONSTITUTIONAL
GOVERNMENT CONDUCT
The concept of waiver is utilized in various contexts in the
criminal justice process. Although defined as an intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege,170
its real meaning varies with the particular right or privilege in-
volved and the attendant circumstances.
The first application of the waiver doctrine involves the re-
linquishment of rights or privileges. The privileges that can be
waived vary from right to counsel at trial to the right to cross-
examine a particular witness. The ease of establishing a valid
waiver varies with the privilege involved. The right to counsel
cannot be waived without prior advice of its existence,171 but the
privilege to cross-examine a particular witness is waived by a
failure to exercise it. 172 Although rarely discussed in terms of
waiver, the guilty plea is a waiver of the most serious nature.
Several rights are relinquished by a guilty plea, including the
rights to be tried by a jury, to con:lront adverse witnesses, and
to call friendly witnesses. Since a waiver of these privileges is
not to be presumed, the Supreme Court has established rigid
guidelines to be followed in accepting guilty pleas. 7 3
The second application of the waiver doctrine is in legitimiz-
ing government conduct that would otherwise be an infringe-
ment of the defendant's constitutional rights. For example, a
170. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
171. See text accompanying note 54 supra.
172. See section IV infra.
173. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969); McCarthy v.
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suspect may consent to a warrantless search of his premises or
he may confess without counsel after being given the Miranda
warnings. 74 In each of the examples the suspect is said to have
waived a right. Again, however, the evidence needed to show
a valid waiver varies in quantity; a mere consent to the search
will suffice, 75 but a prior warning of rights must be given before
a confession is taken.176
A third application of the waiver doctrine is in the enforce-
ment of procedural rules that govern objections to unconstitu-
tional government action. For example, if an objection to the
use of seized evidence is not made before trial or when the evi-
dence is introduced, the defendant suffers forfeiture of his com-
plaint. 77 Deliberate failure to comply with the procedural rule
is considered a waiver. This type of waiver is unlike the waiver
or consent which legitimizes what otherwise would be illegal
government conduct. Failure to object at trial cannot legalize
a prior illegal search or the illegal procurement of a confession;
the government's action remains illegal, but the defendant loses
his right to be convicted by only legally procured evidence.
This waiver is also unlike the waiver of constitutional priv-
ileges. A constitutional privilege may be defined as a constitu-
tional right that is independent of the legality of the govern-
ment's behavior. For example, a defendant has the right to
remain silent at trial, to cross-examine witnesses and to call wit-
nesses. These privileges have nothing to do with the legality
of the government's behavior. The element of government con-
duct is present, however, when the government coerces the de-
fendant's testimony, cuts off the right of cross-examination or
prevents the defendant from obtaining witnesses. Similarly, this
element is present when the government tries to use the fruits
of an illegal search or a coerced confession or when the govern-
ment discriminates in jury selection. In these cases, the consti-
tutional right is not one of choosing between two alternatives
that have nothing to do with government conduct; rather, the
constitutional right becomes part of a broader right to be tried
and convicted by means that the constitution does not prohibit.
United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969).
174. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
175. See, e.g., People v. Ledferd, 38 Il1. 2d 607, 232 N.E.2d 684
(1967); State v. Forney, 181 Neb. 757, 150 N.W.2d 915 (1967). But
cf. United States v. Blalock, 255 F. Supp. 268 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
176. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
177. See the discussion in the following subsections infra.
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The rights involved are designed to protect the individual
against certain government behavior, and the constitution may
be viewed as a direct restraint on that behavior. The all-im-
portant question, then, is whether the government may violate
these constitutional restraints in obtaining a conviction and jus-
tify or excuse its violation by the same waiver doctrine that is
used in the context of constitutional privileges. The significance
of the waiver doctrine in situations involving unconstitutional
government conduct is underscored by the fact that those de-
fendants who follow the procedural rules can win reversals of
their convictions,178 while those who fail to follow the rules
must languish in prison.
The waiver doctrine in the context of unconstitutional gov-
ernment conduct is the topic of this section. At the outset, how-
ever, it should be recognized that courts have not treated un-
constitutional government conduct as posing special issues and
problems. Yet, it is in this context that the ramifications of
the right to counsel are most important, for counsel's waiver de-
cision may be the crucial factor in determining whether freedom
or imprisonment will result for the accused. The problem is to
guarantee that the right to counsel does not defeat the equally
important right to be convicted legally and constitutionally.
A. WAIVER AND FEDERAL REVIEw
Although the Supreme Court had narrowly defined waiver
prior to 1963,179 its definition was not helpful to defendants seek-
ing to allege violations of their constitutional rights which had
not been objected to at trial or some prior appropriate time.
Failure to object or to assert rights at the proper time was suffi-
cient to preclude the defendant from obtaining relief in subse-
quent proceedings.I8 0 State courts strictly enforced state pro-
cedural rules and federal courts were hesitant to intervene. 8 1
178. A reversal would not be won, however, if the constitutional
defect were harmless. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
179. See text accompanying note 170 supra.
180. Perhaps one of the harshest applications of the rule appeared
in Daniels v. Allen, reported sub nom. Brown v. Allen 344 U.S. 443,
(1953). Petitioner had lost his chance 'to appeal alleged discrimination
in jury selection because his lawyer was one day late in filing the
appeal. The Supreme Court held that the delay also cost the de-
fendant the right to assert his claim in federal habeas corpus pro-
ceedings.
181. The procedural rules were seen as necessary to the orderly
administration of the criminal justice system: "We cannot permit an
accused to elect to pursue one course at the trial and then, when that
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Thus, defendant's inaction, which was in reality his lawyer's in-
action, was sufficient to waive constitutional rights.'82
In the 1963 case of Fay v. Noia,' 8 3 the Supreme Court revo-
lutionized the waiver doctrine. Noia and two co-defendants had
been convicted of murder in a New York trial in which the only
evidence consisted of confessions. Although objections to the
admission of the confessions were made at trial, Noia, unlike his
co-defendants, failed to pursue his claim with an appeal. Sub-
sequently, through federal habeas corpus proceedings, the co-
defendants were freed. The state courts, however, would not
grant Noia relief because he had failed to appeal his conviction,
whereupon he turned to federal habeas corpus. He lost in the
district court, but won in the court of appeals. The state, in its
appeal to the Supreme Court, argued that Noia's failure to utilize
a state procedure should have precluded him from federal ha-
beas corpus relief.
First, the Court concluded that the adequate state ground
doctrine, which precludes the Supreme Court from deciding fed-
eral issues on direct review, does not apply to habeas corpus
proceedings. 8 4 Second, the Court held that the exhaustion of
state remedies doctrine bars habeas corpus relief only if the
state remedy is still available at the time habeas corpus is
sought.'8 r' Finally, the Court dealt with the waiver issue by
holding that a federal habeas corpus court has the discretionary
power to deny relief if the defendant previously waived the op-
portunity to make his claim. It emphasized, however, that
waiver was to be defined as it had been in Johnson v. Zerbst and
has proved to be unprofitable, to insist on appeal that the course which
he rejected at the trial be reopened to him." Johnson v. United States,
318 U.S. 189, 201 (1943). Denying the defendant a remedy from a state
conviction was usually justified by one of three doctrines: (a) ade-
quate state ground; (b) failure to exhaust state remedies, or (c) waiver.
For an excellent discussion of the deficiencies in these grounds and for
an exhaustive treatment of the law before Fay v. Noia, see Reitz, Fed-
eral Habeas Corpus: Impact of an Abortive State Proceeding, 74
HARV. L. REv. 1315 (1961).
182. There was little discussion of the fact that counsel, and not
the defendant, was responsible for the forfeiture of these rights. This
is understandable in light of the long-established rule that counsel is
manager of the suit and the accused is bound by his actions. See dis-
cussion at text accompanying notes 195-209 infra.
183. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
184. The adequate state ground could be a procedural ground such
as the failure to appeal, 372 U.S. at 428-29. See also Reitz, supra
note 181, at 1345-52.
185. 372 U.S. at 434-35.
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concluded that the discretion to deny relief is exercised properly
only if "[a] habeas applicant ... understandingly and know-
ingly forewent the privilege of seeking to vindicate his federal
claims in the state courts, whether for strategic, tactical, or any
other reasons that can fairly be described as the deliberate by-
passing of state procedures .... Y,186 The federal court has to
satisfy itself by a hearing or by other means that the defendant
deliberately waived his rights.187
The Supreme Court again extended the use of the waiver
doctrine in Henry v. Mississippi.88 Defendant's lawyer had
failed to make a fourth amendment objection to evidence when
it was introduced at trial, as Mississippi law required. The Mis-
sissippi Supreme Court, which had previously found the search
unconstitutional, denied relief because of this failure. The Su-
preme Court recognized that an adequate state procedural
ground would preclude it from reaching the federal question
because the case was before it on direct review. Rather than
considering the validity of Mississippi's rule, however, the Court
remanded the case for a determination of whether the defendant
had waived his objection by deliberately foregoing the oppor-
tunity to object.'8 9 If he had, he would be precluded from direct
and collateral relief, except to the extent he could convince a
federal court that the state's finding of waiver was erroneous.190
If he had not, then the adequate state ground doctrine might
be interjected to prevent direct review, but the defendant could
seek relief in federal habeas corpus proceedings. By ignoring
the opportunity to utilize the adequate state ground doctrine
and by casting doubt on its utility at least in some cases of direct
review,191 the Court increased the importance of the Johnson v.
186. 372 U.S. at 439. If the applicant by-passes a state oppor-
tunity to make his claim, a federal courl cannot deny collateral relief
on the basis of waiver when a state appellate court has ignored the
waiver and considered the merits of the claim. Warden v. Hayden,
387 U.S. 294, 297 n.3 (1967). See also Curry v. Wilson, 405 F.2d 110
(9th Cir. 1968).
187. 372 U.S. at 439. For the rules governing when a federal court
must hold a hearing to resolve an issue, see Townsend v. Sain, 372
U.S. 293 (1963), discussed in the text at notes 234-43 infra.
188. 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
189. The Mississippi Supreme Court subsequently found that a
waiver had occurred. Henry v. State, 198 So. 2d 213 (Miss. 1967),
cert. denied, 392 U.S. 931 (1968).
190. Waiver is a federal question enabling the federal courts to re-
consider the facts. Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 & n.4 (1966).
191. Defendant's lawyer in moving for a directed verdict had men-
tioned, albeit perfunctorily, the fourth amendment objection. The Su-
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Zerbst standard of waiver in the administration of criminal jus-
tice.192
In Kaufman v. United States,1 3 the Supreme Court dealt
with the contention that a failure of a federal defendant to assert
a fourth amendment objection on appeal precluded his doing so
on a motion to vacate judgment. 94 The Supreme Court held
that collateral relief for federal prisoners must be as broad as
that for state prisoners who can be denied relief only for de-
liberately forfeiting their remedies.
It is therefore clear that, subject to the court's discretionary
power to ignore a waiver, only a deliberate failure to raise con-
stitutional issues in previous proceedings will preclude the de-
fendant from obtaining federal collateral relief. What is not
clear, however, is who-counsel or the accused-must make the
waiver decision.
B. WAvRn, BY WHOM?
The fundamental issue that has plagued the courts is
whether counsel or the accused must make the knowing and in-
tentional waiver. In general, two often overlapping rules place
authority in counsel's hands.
1. Waiver by Counsel, When a Matter of Trial Strategy
A rule with widespread judicial following is that counsel,
and not the accused, is in charge of trial strategy and tactics.
The leading case supporting this rule is Nelson v. People. 95
In Nelson, trial counsel had ignored the defendant's request to
make a fourth amendment objection to evidence introduced at
trial.190 In holding that counsel acted within his authority, the
court listed several reasons to support its position that counsel,
and not the accused, must manage the case and make these deci-
sions: (a) only counsel is competent to make such decisions;
(b) the defendant probably would do himself more harm than
preme Court suggested this might have been enough to serve the pur-
poses of Mississippi's timely objection rule. Therefore, the state ground
might not have been adequate to preclude direct review. 379 U.S. at
448-49.
192. But cf. Hill, The Inadequate State Ground, 65 COLum. L. Rnv.
943, 984 (1965).
193. 394 U.S. 217 (1969).
194. This contention found considerable support among the federal
courts. See 394 U.S. at 220 n.3.
195. 346 F.2d 73 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 964 (1965).
196. Nelson is somewhat atypical because the defendant actually
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good if he were permitted to decide, and (c) few counsel would
want to represent the accused if the latter had control over the
decisions to be made.197
The first two reasons are basically identical and difficult to
refute.'9 8  This is no consolation, however, to a defendant who
is convicted because counsel del'.berately failed to make
an objection that hindsight reveals. should have been made.
The harshness of this approach is increased, moreover, by the
fact that collateral courts are reluctant to grant the defendant
relief under the doctrine of ineffective assistance of counsel.199
Thus, while counsel's authority is beneficial to the accused in
most instances, the Nelson rationale forsakes those defendants
who have lost legitimate constitutional objections because of
counsel's representation. 20 0  The final reason for giving counsel
absolute authority in the case is that few attorneys would accept
representation of criminal defendants were it otherwise. There
is merit to such a view, especially when it is remembered that
counsel on the civil side of the law can enjoy a lucrative practice
free from client interference.201  But conceding that counsel
must make most trial decisions, even when the defendant dis-
agrees with the tactics chosen, it still remains open to question
disagreed with counsel at trial. In the more typical case, counsel makes
his decision without consulting the accused and the accused does not
complain until after conviction. Nevertheless, the Nelson reasoning is
used in the latter cases. In fact, a fortiori the latter cases are governed
by Nelson; if counsel can decide on tactics when the defendant objects,
he surely can do so when the defendant is silent.
197. 346 F.2d at 81.
198. It is ironic, however, that the same court adheres to the view
that the accused has a constitutional right to proceed pro se even
though he would harm himself. Id. at 81. n.8. Bayless v. United States,
381 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1967). Most courts acknowledge a right to pro-
ceed pro se only when it is asserted befo.e trial (see text accompanying
note 28 supra, but Nelson would allow the defendant to discharge coun-
sel and make his objection. Thus, the constitutional objection is made
at the cost of losing counsel's assistance. But cf. Williams v. Beto, 354
F.2d 698, 706 (5th Cir. 1965) ("If the indigent client . . . knows more
about what ought to be done in handling the case, then he needs no
counsel and it is folly for him to ask for it.").
199. See section IV infra.
200. But cf. United States ex rel. Bruno v. Harold, 408 F.2d 125, 129(2d Cir. 1969) (Waterman, J. dissenting) (counsel's strategy and the
importance of the right should be evaluated before counsel's waiver is
found binding on the accused). See also Note, Waiver of Constitutional
Rights by Counsel in a Criminal Proceeding, 1 JoHN MARSHALL J. PRAc.
& P o. 93, 105-10 (1967).
201. See generally Mazor, Power and Responsibility in the At-
torney-Client Relationship, 20 STA. L. Rnv. 1120 (1968).
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whether counsel's decision should enable the government to con-
vict the accused unconstitutionally.
In deciding Nelson, the court was forced to reconcile its rule
with the Supreme Court's decisions in Noia and Henry.20 2 Al-
though the Supreme Court stated in Noia that an intentional
and deliberate failure to appeal would constitute a waiver of fur-
ther objections to a coerced confession, it added:
At all events we wish it clearly understood that the standard
here put forth depends on the considered choice of the peti-
tioner. A choice made by counsel not participated in by the
petitioner does not automatically bar relief.203 [footnotes
omitted].
In Henry, however, the Court held that the decision during trial
not to make a fourth amendment objection to evidence was one
that counsel could make for his client.204 The Nelson court re-
solved the apparent contradiction by concluding that the deci-
sion to appeal in Noia was not a matter of trial strategy as was
the decision to by-pass the contemporaneous objection rule at
trial.20 5 Other courts have agreed that Noia and Henry are dis-
tinguishable by the fact that the former did not involve a matter
of trial tactics.20  Such a reading of these cases, however, leads
to anomalous conclusions. For example, it would seem that the
decision not to appeal a conviction based on a coerced confes-
sion must be made by the defendant 20 7 while the decision not to
object to the same confession at trial must be made by counsel.
If this is so, then the crucial fact in characterizing a decision as
trial strategy is not necessarily the particular constitutional right
involved, but rather the stage of the proceedings at which the
waiver occurs.20 s Such a distinction completely obliterates any
notion that the purpose of the rule is to prevent defendants from
harming themselves. Rather, the real reason for giving counsel
202. See text accompanying notes 183-87, 188-90 supra.
203. 372 U.S. at 439.
204. 379 U.S. at 451-52.
205. 346 F.2d at 81 & n.6.
206. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 36 Ill. 2d 194, 201, 222 N.E.2d 321,
325 (1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 923 (1967).
207. Cf. United States ex rel. Masselli v. Reincke, 383 F.2d 129
(2d Cir. 1967); Wainwright v. Simpson, 360 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1966).
208. Another way of distinguishing tactics from non-tactics is to
examine the opportunity for consultation. Thus, decisions made in
the heat of battle are for counsel, while those made when there is
time to consult (e.g., pleading, stipulating a trial on a transcript of
testimony, appealing) require the defendant's participation. See Note,
Criminal Waiver: The Requirements of Personal Participation, Compe-
tence and Legitimate State Interest, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 1262 (1966).
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complete authority in decisions deemed tactical seems to be the
interest in preserving order and finality in criminal trials. 20 9
2. Waiver by Counsel, Except in Exceptional Circumstances
Another rule, although an exception to the Nelson rule, is
also applied to give counsel authority to make most waiver deci-
sions. The rule was first stated in Henry:
Although trial strategy adopted by counsel without prior con-
sultation with an accused will not, where the circumstances are
exceptional, preclude the accused from asserting constitutional
claims, see Whitus v. Balkcom... we think that the deliberate
bypassing by counsel of the contemporaneous-objection rule as a
part of trial strategy would have that effect in this case.210
The language implies that when the circumstances are excep-
tional, the accused must participate in the waiver. The problem
lies in defining "exceptional circumstances." The only clue to
the meaning of this term is provided by the citation to Whitus v.
Balkcom. 211 In that case, trial counsel, without consulting their
clients, decided not to object to the systematic exclusion of Ne-
groes from the grand and petit juries. In the habeas corpus
hearing, it was revealed that counsel had been aware of the
systematic exclusion but had reasoned that an objection would
increase the hostility of white jurors toward the defendants.2 12
Hence, a deliberate and intentional choice was made to by-pass
the available state opportunity to present the objection. Nev-
ertheless, the court of appeals held that counsel's waiver was
not binding on the accused.
The problem with Whitus is that the reasons underlying the
decision are not all clear. At one point in the decision, one of
the holdings of Fay v. Noia seems to have been the crucial
factor.213 Although Noia had participated in the decision not to
appeal his conviction, the Supreme Court refused to find a waiver
209. Copeland v. Commonwealth, 415 S.W.2d 842 (Ky. 1967). If
counsel is responsible for the waiver decision it is less difficult tojustify finding a waiver from a mere nonobjection, and such passive
waivers greatly aid the enforcement of procedural rules. See Curry v.
Wilson, 405 F.2d 110, 113 (9th Cir. 1968); Henry v. State, 198 So. 2d 213(MViss. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 931 (1968); Kuhl v. United States, 370
F.2d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1966).
210. 379 U.S. at 451-52 (emphasis added).
211. 333 F.2d 496 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 931 (1964).
212. There is no indication in the Whitus opinion that counsel may
have made a stupid choice, but at least one court has defined exceptional
circumstances in terms of counsel's stupidity. See Jarrell v. Boles, 272
F. Supp. 755, 757 n.2 (N.D. W. Va. 1967).
213. 333 F.2d at 498-99.
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because the choice of alternatives was "grisly." Noia had been
given a life sentence and the risk of execution if tried again was
substantial, especially in light of certain hostile remarks by the
trial judge.214 The Whitus court saw a similarity in being forced
to choose between an unfairly selected jury and a prejudiced
one.2 15 At least one court is convinced that the grisly choice in
Whitus is what Henry was referring to as exceptional circum-
stances.216 In other words, counsel would have to obtain the
defendant's consent before waiving constitutional rights only
when the choice of alternatives was grisly. This interpretation
entirely misses the point of Noia which- held, first, that a per-
sonal waiver by the accused was necessary and, second, that
even a personal waiver would be invalid when there was no
real choice of alternatives. 21 7 Grisly circumstances do not help
determine when the accused, and not counsel, must waive the
right.
In another part of its opinion, the Whitus court referred
directly to the language in Noia which indicated that the ac-
cused must personally make the waiver decision. 218 Whitus read
this to mean that the defendant's consent was necessary in all
but ordinary procedural decisions. 21 9 The Whitus court, how-
ever, was not convinced that Noia's requirement of a personal
waiver would protect the accused from losing valid constitu-
tional objections. It would be an empty gesture to require coun-
sel to obtain the consent of a defendant who lacked the capacity
to understandingly and knowingly waive his rights.220 Hence,
the Whitus opinion was not based on counsel's failure to obtain
the consent of the accused before waiving the jury defects.
At least one court believes, however, that consultation
would protect ignorant defendants. This court has found that
exceptional circumstances exist when the defendant is igno-
214. 372 U.S. at 440. This may be the weakest part of the holding.
See id. at 471-72 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
215. 333 F.2d at 498-99.
216. Commonwealth v. Snyder, 427 Pa. 83, 233 A.2d 530 (1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 983 (1968) (counsel entitled to decide not to con-
test a confession).
217. See text accompanying note 214 supra
218. 333 F.2d at 501.
219. In United States ex rel. Goldsby v. Harpole, 263 F.2d 71 (5th
Cir.), cert denied, 361 U.S. 838 & 850 (1959), the court had said that
the defendant was only bound by counsel's decision to forego objection
to the jury if the record affirmatively showed that a particular jury
was actually desired by counsel. In Whitus the court evidently felt
that Noia required more than this.
220. 333 F.2d at 503, referring to 372 U. S. at 439.
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rant.221 This anomaly requires counsel to consult with the ac-
cused only when the accused lacks the capacity to make a know-
ing waiver. If anything, this would be the one circumstance
which justifies forcing the accused to abide by counsel's deci-
sion.22
2
In several sections of its opinion, the Whitus court indicated
that the objection to the jury defect simply could not have been
waived.223  It is possible to infer that this was its holding.
Since the court felt that the accused needed protection against
the waiver of his rights by counsel, and since it also felt that
this protection could not be provided by requiring a personal
waiver, the only conclusion is thai; the defect could not be
waived. If this is the holding, Heny's citation to Whitus is a
red herring because Whitus has nothing to say about the ex-
istence of exceptional circumstances :requiring a personal waiver
from the accused.
One court, not willing to go this :ar, has read Whitus to hold
that the accused must make a personal waiver whenever the
right involved goes to the very foundation of the proceedings. 224
Rather than concluding that some :rights are too fundamental
to be waived, this rule states that the accused must personally
waive certain fundamental rights. Such an interpretation of
Whitus gains support from the Supreme Court's decision in
Brookhart v. Janis.225 In the trial of the case counsel had sub-
mitted the issue of guilt to determination by a prima facie case,
which was tantamount to a plea of guilty, in spite of the de-
fendant's express statement that he was not pleading guilty in
any way. The Court, referring to its exceptional circumstances
221. In United States ex rel. Cuevas v. Rundle, 258 F. Supp. 647
(E.D. Pa. 1966), defendant pleaded guilty after a confession had been
obtained from him which his attorney did not contest. The court found
exceptional circumstances in that defendant knew little English, had
limited schooling and had a history of seizures. The court, however,
tried to limit its holding by stating that under these circumstances de-
fendant's guilty plea could not be characterized as voluntary.
222. Cf. Cobb v. State, 218 Ga. 10, 126 S.E.2d 231 (1962), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 948 (1963).
223. 333 F.2d at 498 & n.3 passim.
224. In Ledbetter v. Warden, 368 F.2d 490 (4th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 971 (1967), the court held that counsel alone could not
waive an objection to a confession which was the sole evidence against
the accused. The court also noted, however, that the ground for objec-
tion was unknown to counsel at the date of trial. Cf. Jarrell v. Boles,
272 F. Supp. 755 (N-f. W. Va. 1967), himiting Ledbetter to its facts.
225. 384 U.S. 1 (1966).
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language in Henry,228 stated that nothing in Henry could sup-
port the idea that counsel, by preventing the accused from plead-
ing not guilty, could eliminate his right to confront the witnesses
against him.227 Justice Harlan, concurring, noted that the
waiver was more significant than the waiver of the right to
cross-examine a particular witness.2 28  Hence, the Brookhart
opinion supports the view that exceptional circumstances exist
whenever fundamental and significant rights are being waived 229
None of the tests for determining what constitutes "excep-
tional circumstances" is particularly satisfying. Although the
last approach does acknowledge that some rights are too basic to
be forfeited by proxy, it does not help in determining which
rights are so basic. Moreover, the last approach tends to become
confused with the rule that counsel must make tactical decisions.
Indeed, Justice Harlan distinguished the waiver of the right to
cross-examine a particular witness from the complete waiver of
the right of cross-examination by characterizing the first as tac-
tical and the latter as nontactical. 230 With the issue so muddled,
it is not surprising that only a few courts find exceptional cir-
cumstances to exist.231
In summary, it is clear that there is some ill-defined concern
about permitting counsel to forfeit the accused's constitutional
rights. But the rules have not delineated when a personal
waiver is necessary. Moreover, it is easy to agree with the
Whitus statement that a rule of personal waiver would be an
empty gesture in most cases. Added protection for the accused
will not be found in a rule that entitles him to become involved
in trial decisions.
226. See text accompanying note 210 supra.
227. 384 U.S. at 7-8.
228. Id. at 9 (Harlan, J., concurring).
229. See Note, supra note 200, at 104-05.
230. 384 U.S. at 9 (Harlan, J., concurring).
231. Poole v. Fitzharris, 396 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1968) (case submitted
on transcript of testimony from preliminary hearing; court felt it "un-
fortunate" that counsel did not explain the procedure to defendant);
Wilson v. Gray, 345 F.2d 282 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 919 (1965)(same issue; exceptional circumstances can be decided only on a case by
case basis); Jarrell v. Boles, 272 F. Supp. 755 (N.D. W. Va. 1967) (coerced
confession; exceptional circumstances exist only when counsel's choice
is so erroneous as to amount to ineffective assistance of counsel);
McParlin v. Langlois, 244 A.2d 251, 253 (R.I. 1968) (Joslin & Kelleher, JJ.,
concurring); Commonwealth v. Snyder, 427 Pa. 83, 233 A.2d 530
(1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 983 (1968). But cf. Smith v. Breazeale,
245 F. Supp. 978 (N.D. Miss. 1965) (systematic exclusion of Negroes




C. PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS CREATED BY THE WAIVR DocmN
When a petitioner asserts that he has been convicted un-
constitutionally, the habeas corpus court must ascertain whether
or not the complaint has been waived. A study of the problems
facing the court when it makes this decision reveals that the
waiver doctrine is extremely difficult to administer.
1. The Need for an Evidentiary Hearing
Since Fay v. Noia, a criminal defendant is guaranteed access
to a federal court for collateral relief unless prior available pro-
cedures for presenting his claim were deliberately by-passed.232
Not every petitioner, however, gets a hearing from the habeas
court on the issues he has raised.233 The rules to determine
whether a hearing is necessary were defined by the Supreme
Court in Townsend v. Sain:234
Where the facts are in dispute, the federal court in habeas cor-
pus must hold an evidentiary hearing if the habeas applicant
did not receive a full and fair evidentiary hearing in a state
court, either at the time of the trial or in a collateral proceed-
ing.23 5
Townsend makes it clear that there is to be no speculation
in determining whether constitutional rights have been violated;
the defendant is entitled to at least one full evidentiary hearing
on his claim. Townsend must, of course, be read with Noia so
that if there has been a deliberate by-passing of a previous oppor-
tunity to present the claim, a hearing on the substantive issue
is not necessary. The crucial first issue before the court, there-
fore, is the question of waiver. Noia states that a habeas court
must satisfy itself that there has been a waiver by holding a
hearing or by other means, 236 but if this is to be read consistently
with Townsend it would seem that a hearing is required when-
ever the facts are in dispute as to Whether the failure to utilize
available procedure was deliberate and knowing.237 The "other
means" spoken of in Noia would suffice only if they could elim-
232. See text accompanying notes 183-93 supra.
233. For an excellent explanation of the habeas corpus procedure,
see Note, The Development of the Plenary Hearing Requirement in
Federal Habeas Corpus For State Prisoners, 34 BROoxLYN L. REV.
247 (1968).
234. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
235. Id. at 312.
236. 372 U.S. at 439.
237. Cf. Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962) (record
could cast no light on the issue in dispute).
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inate all factual dispute. For example, the record may establish
that counsel explicitly told the trial court that he was not ob-
jecting,238 or the defendant inadvertently may have admitted to
the habeas court that counsel deliberately by-passed available
procedure. 23 9  Some courts, however, have intimated that they
can infer a deliberate waiver from a trial record that is devoid
of any positive affirmations from counsel. 240 One of the few
cases taking a more honest approach is United States ex rel. Hill
v. Pinto.241 In that case trial counsel remained silent while the
prosecution offered as rebuttal evidence two written statements
made by the accused. The defendant in trial testimony had ad-
mitted making the statements, but he claimed that the first one
was false. From the record before it the court noted the ease
with which it could infer that the failure to object was deliberate
strategy: (1) the statements did not differ substantially from
the defendant's testimony on direct examination, and (2) counsel
may have been trying to discredit a third, more damaging, oral
admission. Nevertheless, the court acknowledged the possibility
that counsel did not know that he could object to the confessions.
Since a factual dispute existed as to whether the failure to object
was deliberate, the court ordered an evidentiary hearing.
The Supreme Court's decision in Henry supports the view
that the Hill approach is the more honest one. In Henry the
facts from which a waiver could have been inferred were even
stronger than in Hill. One of the trial lawyers had begun to
stand as if to object to the evidence obtained from the search
of the defendant's car, but co-counsel had pulled him back into
his seat. Even though the Supreme Court was able to infer two
tactical reasons for co-counsel's action, it remanded the case for
a hearing to determine whether the waiver was in fact deliber-
238. For example, counsel may stipulate to the admission of a
confession. E.g., In re Reynolds, 397 F.2d 131 (3rd Cir. 1968).
239. In Nelson v. People, 346 F.2d 73 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 964 (1965), defendant told the court that he had wanted the
legality of the search put in issue but that counsel did not think he
could overcome the consent issue. Such an admission would serve the
defendant's cause only in those jurisdictions requiring a personal waiver
from the accused. See, e.g., State v. Mendes, 99 R.I. 606, 210 A.2d 50
(1965).
240. E.g., Commonwealth v. Snyder, 427 Pa. 83, 233 A.2d 530 (1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 983 (1968) (counsel most likely did not object
because he viewed the confessions as largely excuplatory). Contra,
United States ex rel. Snyder v. Mazurkiewicz, 413 F.2d 500 (3d Cir.
1969).
241. 394 F.2d 470 (3rd Cir. 1968). See also United States ex rel.
Snyder v. Mazurkiewicz, 413 F.2d 500 (3d Cir. 1969).
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ate.242 This should demonstrate conclusively that the first order
of business for a habeas court should be a hearing on the waiver
issue.243
In guilty-plea cases, however, the plea itself constitutes a
waiver of all nonjurisdictional defects. 244 Recently the Supreme
Court held that a defendant's plea of guilty based on reasonably
competent advice by counsel is not open to collateral attack on
grounds that a coerced confession motivated the plea.245 Hence,
there need be no speculation as to waiver in guilty-plea cases;
the choice to plead guilty indicates a decision to waive.
2. The Criterion of a "Deliberate" Waover
One of the fears underlying the reluctance to hold an evi-
dentiary hearing on the waiver issue is the opportunity for in-
tentional or unintentional after-the-fact tinkering.24 6 The only
manner of ascertaining whether the failure to object was de-
liberate or inadvertent is to call on counsel to testify at the hear-
ing. Counsel's dilemma is whether -to assert a tactical reason
for his decision, thus depriving his former client the collateral
relief he seeks, or to admit inadvertence, thus impugning his
own professional competence. 247
If counsel testifies that he deliberately failed to object to the
alleged government illegality, the waiver issue is resolved. Even
this, however, cannot guarantee the end of collateral proceed-
ings. The petitioner may allege that he was denied effective
assistance of counsel because the choice made by counsel was
egregious.248 This claim would be especially strong in those cases
in which the evidence not objected to was the only substantial
evidence linking the defendant to the crime.
Another problem encountered at the evidentiary hearing is
that impediments may preclude a satisfactory solution of the
242. 379 U.S. at 450-52. On remand, a waiver was found; see note
189 supra.
243. See also Note, supra note 233, at 262.
244. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Garrett v. Russel, 281 F. Supp.
104 (E.D. Pa. 1968). See also Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969)
(guilty plea is more than a confession; i is a conviction); Hughes v.
United States, 371 F.2d 694 (8th Cir. 1967).
245. McMann v. Richardson, 38 U.S.L.W. 4379 (May 4, 1970).
246. See Kuhl v. United States, 370 F.2d 20 (9th Cir. 1966).
247. Id. at 27.
248. United States ex rel. Cornitcher v. Rundle, 285 F. Supp. 625,
628-29 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (asserting that the ineffective assistance of
counsel doctrine is distinct from the waivex doctrine). The doctrine of
ineffective assistance of counsel is discussed in section IV infra.
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issue. When the Supreme Court remanded Henry, it stated that
a hearing was necessary to enable Mississippi to show that a
waiver had occurred.249 In the evidentiary hearing, the state
was unable to prove anything beyond what already was known:
that one counsel had deterred another who was beginning to
rise as if to object. The attorney-client privilege was invoked
so that trial counsel did not have to divulge his communications
with the accused concerning the possibility of a waiver, and the
privilege against self-incrimination was utilized so that the ac-
cused did not have to divulge any relevant information.250  The
Mississippi Supreme Court, obviously annoyed by the futility of
the proceedings, found the waiver to have been deliberate.
25 1
3. The Criterion of a "Knowing" Waiver
Although rarely discussed in the cases, a potentially trouble-
some problem for the habeas court is that the waiver must be of
a "known right or privilege. ' 25 2 The issue is the amount of falli-
bility that can be tolerated in counsel's decision not to object be-
fore the conclusion must be made that counsel did not "know"
of the defendant's right. One of the few cases adequately to dis-
cuss the issue is Kuhl v. United States.253 During trial counsel
began to cross-examine a police officer as to the propriety of
the search of the defendant's home. When the prosecutor ob-
jected that the defendant had no standing to raise the issue,
counsel concurred stating that the fourth amendment claim prob-
ably was not applicable to the defendant. The Kuhl court char-
acterized counsel's decision as, at most, a mistake of law.2 54 Nev-
ertheless, it still found a knowing waiver of the objection. The
court stated that counsel knew the facts pertaining to the search
and that there was an arguable basis for an objection. It is sel-
dom, continued the court, that counsel can know whether an
objection will be good or bad; he must make a decision on the
basis of his beliefs.2 55 The "known right or privilege" was said
to be no more than knowledge of the right to present the conten-
tion to the court.25 6
249. 379 U.S. at 450.
250. Henry v. State, 198 So. 2d 213, 217 (Mliss. 1967), cert. denied,
392 U.S. 931 (1968).
251. Id. at 218.
252. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), applied in Fay v. Noia,
372 U.S. 391, 439 (1963).
253. 370 F.2d 20 (9th Cir. 1966).
254. Id. at 25.




The dissent was not satisfied with this definition. The
known right, it argued, is not merely the procedural right of
objecting in court but includes the substantive constitutional
right. Since counsel believed that the defendant had no fourth
amendment objection, the right was not a known right in regard
to the particular defendant. 257
Both positions have some merit. On the dissent's side it may
be said that almost all counsel know of the existence of proce-
dures entitling them to make objections. If this were the extent
of knowledge required, a waiver would have to be found in all
cases. Moreover, counsel in Henry indicated knowledge of the
procedural right by rising as if to object,258 but the Supreme
Court did not suggest that this alone could constitute a waiver.250
On the other hand, the dissent appears to impose a require-
ment of infallible counsel. There is no waiver, it argued, unless
the right is known as to the particular defendant. Such a re-
quirement would destroy finality in criminal cases. The habeas
court not only would have to find a deliberate waiver, but it
would have to make an after-the-fact determination of counsel's
legal knowledge.260
The Kuhl case demonstrates the difficulty of utilizing the
waiver doctrine in the context of unconstitutional government
action. 261 When constitutional privileges are involved, the only
problem is to determine whether the privilege waived was in fact
known. When one's right, however, depends on an evaluation
257. Id. at 33 (Hamley, Jertberg, Browning & Ely, J.J., dissenting).
258. 379 U.S. at 450.
259. Cf. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317 (1963): "[I]f for some
justifiable reason [the applicant] was previously unable to assert his
rights or was unaware of the significance of relevant facts, it is neither
necessary nor reasonable to deny him all opportunity of obtaining
judicial relief." See also People v. Johnson, 38 Ill. 2d 399, 231 N.E.2d
447 (1967) (decision made through inadvertance or induced by trial
court is not trial "strategy"); People v. Williams, 36 Ill. 2d 194, 222
N.E.2d 321 (1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 923 (1967) (trial strategy of
counsel, but not his "honest mistakes," preclude defendant from get-
ting relief).
260. Cf. United States ex rel. Cornitcher v. Rundle, 285 F. Supp. 625
(E.D. Pa. 1968) which held that waiver, and not the reason for waiver,
is all that matters.
261. The distinction between a right to object to unconstitutional
government action and a constitutional privilege that does not depend
on the legality of the government's behavior was discussed in the text
accompanying notes 177-78 supra. See also the more detailed discus-
sion accompanying notes 264-71 infra.
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of the legality of prior government conduct, it is less meaningful
to speak of a known right; a right exists only if the government
actually violated the constitution. For example, there is no right
to exclude evidence unless the government's search was in fact
unconstitutional. It is inaccurate to speak of a "known" right un-
less the right absolutely exists so the defendant, or counsel, can
know of it. All that possibly can be known in the context of
unconstitutional government conduct is that a certain procedure
is available to determine if a right in fact exists. When counsel
deliberately and knowingly by-passes this procedure, this cannot
be termed a waiver of a "known right or privilege;" if it were
known that the government acted unconstitutionally, few coun-
sel would waive the objection.
D. A NEW APPROACH TO WAIVER
Up to this point, the discussion has revealed that the waiver
doctrine, although greatly expanded in recent years, still works
to the disadvantage of the accused. Counsel has the authority
to waive the accused's most fundamental rights and habeas cor-
pus courts are all too eager to find a waiver from counsel's mere
failure to make objections. The courts cannot be condemned,
however, because any other approach would place an intolerable
burden on them. In short, the present doctrine permits an ac-
cused to be convicted unconstitutionally and forces the habeas
courts to be less than honest in finding a waiver. Moreover, the
law on waiver practically guarantees a petition to the habeas
court since a defendant has nothing to lose from asserting that
counsel's silence did not constitute a knowing and deliberate
waiver or that he, and not counsel, should have made the waiver
in the particular circumstances. 262
As discussed above, giving the accused the right to make
waiver decisions would not help. The accused usually cannot
understand the legal ramifications of trial decisions, and placing
the responsibility on him would only increase the likelihood of
unfairness. In addition, since the subjective intent of the ac-
cused would be at least as difficult to ascertain as that of counsel,
such an approach would not be more satisfactory procedurally.
Therefore, habeas corpus courts would still be faced with the
dilemma of whether or not to hold a hearing to determine if a
262. The number of habeas corpus petitions filed by state prisoners




waiver had occurred through silence.2 6 3 If a hearing were held,
the difficulty in ascertaining that the waiver was "deliberate"
and "knowing" would be increased because the inducement for
perjury would be greater than the average man faced with a
prison sentence could withstand. Therefore, it can only be con-
cluded that any rule increasing the accused's power to manage
his case would preclude achieving the goal of having a system
in which all convictions are legally procured and would increase
the procedural problems faced by the habeas corpus courts. The
solution to the problem is not a different allocation of waiver
responsibility; instead, an entirely new approach is needed.
1. Abolishing Waiver in the Context of Unconstitutional Gov-
ernment Action
As discussed previously, some constitutional rights can be
characterized as privileges because they do not depend on a de-
termination that the government has violated the constitution.
The rights to a jury trial, to cross-examnine witnesses, to send for
witnesses and to testify on one's own behalf do not depend on
the propriety of prior government action; these are privileges
which every defendant may exercise in every trial. There can,
of course, be cases where government illegality is involved, such
as when the government prevents the accused from cross-ex-
amining a prosecution witness 264 or from sending for a friendly
witness.265 In such a case, more than a privilege is involved; the
conviction itself becomes tainted because the government has
violated the supreme law of the land.
It is not always easy to determine whether a case involves
unconstitutional government actioa. Examples of conduct
clearly illegal are warrantless searches, coerced confessions, com-
ments on the accused's failure to testify, discrimination in jury
selection, failure to inform the defendant of the nature of the
accusation and preventing him from confronting or calling wit-
nesses. Other cases may not be so readily classified as involving
unconstitutional action. The accused has a right to a speedy
trial; if the government delays and the accused does not protest,
can it be said the government has acted unconstitutionally?6 0
263. See United States ex rel. Snyder v. Mazurkiewicz, 413 F.2d 500
(3d Cir. 1969).
264. See, e.g., Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968); Smith v. Illinois,
390 U.S. 129 (1968).
265. See, e.g., Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
266. The cases decided by the United States Supreme Court have
involved situations in which the defendant demanded that he be
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Government conduct cannot be divorced from this right, for
whether or not the accused protests, the government is respon-
sible for initiating the proceedings. Most states, however, hold
that the government has not acted unconstitutionally until the
defendant demands that he be brought to trial.267 This approach
appears sound provided an exception is made for cases in which
the delay is so great that unreasonableness must be found re-
gardless of the defendant's action.268 In other words, the right
to a speedy trial could be characterized as a privilege until de-
manded by the accused. Once trial is justifiably demanded, the
government must initiate proceedings. In addition, the govern-
ment would have to initiate proceedings at some point in time
-whether or not the accused demands trial--or its delay would
be unconstitutional. It would be for the courts to ascertain this
point in time; the standard of reasonableness would seem to be
a valid test.2 9
The above analysis suggests the approach that could be fol-
lowed in distinguishing a constitutional privilege from a right to
prevent unconstitutional government conduct. First, it is clear
that some government conduct is illegal per se. Second, there
are some areas in which unconstitutional government action will
not be found until the government denies a justifiable demand
by the accused. Third, some government conduct which is not
unconstitutional per se may become so because of excessiveness.
Hence, delay in trial can become unconstitutional when the delay
is excessive. Similarly, although a defendant may have a right
to demand a severance of offenses, 27 0 failure to sever absent a
demand may not be unconstitutional unless the joinder is so un-
brought to trial but the government refused. See Smith v. Hooey, 393
U.S. 374 (1969); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
267. See, e.g., Bruce v. United States, 351 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1965).
See also Note, The Lagging Right to a Speedy Trial, 51 VA. L. REV.
1587 (1965).
268. Some states will dismiss an indictment on a motion prior to
trial even though the defendant never demanded trial. See, e.g.,
Hicks v. People, 148 Colo. 26, 364 P.2d 877 (1961). Such an approach
recognizes that government illegality can arise independent of the
accused's actions. It is submitted that this minority view is correct.
269. Hence, there would be two standards of reasonableness: one
to determine if the accused is justified in demanding trial, see United
States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966), and the other to determine if the
government had delayed beyond the point justified absent a demand
for trial. The latter standard must be the one used by the minority of
jurisdictions referred to in note 268 supra.
270. See, e.g., Cross v. United States, 335 F.2d 987 (D.C. Cir. 1964);
Drew v. United States, 331 F.2d 85 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
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reasonable that it should not be permitted in any case.271
Even in the early cases dealing with waiver, some distinction
was made between privileges that were merely for the benefit
of the accused and rights so important that the state prohibited
waiver.272 Justice Frankfurter also was aware that not all con-
stitutional rights should be treated in the same manner:
Normally rights under the Federal Constitution may be waived
at the trial . . . and may likewise be waived by failure to as-
sert such errors on appeal .... Such considerations of or-
derly appellate procedure give rise to the conventional state-
ment that habeas corpus should not do service for an appeal.
* * * However, this does not touch one of those extraordinary
cases in which a substantial claim goes to the very foundation of
a proceeding.273
The statement was made in a case involving a claim of dis-
crimination in jury selection, but it cannot be said for certain
that Justice Frankfurter, any more tham the judges in the earlier
cases, was distinguishing situations involving unconstitutional
government action. Just this distinction, however, was made by
the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Whitus.2' 4 The court first acknowl-
edged that a rule permitting waiver of constitutional privileges
is supported by consideration of fairness. That is, if a constitu-
tional privilege is designed to help guarantee a fair trial, the de-
fendant or his counsel should be permitted to waive it if he can
thereby obtain a fairer trial. But the court added that these
considerations of fairness, which permit an accused to follow
what seems to him the most advantageous approach, are not rel-
evant when unconstitutional action is involved.2 7 It is highly
unlikely that many waivers of constitutional defects are made
271. It is possible that a joinder may be so prejudicial that the trial
constitutes a violation of due process. This was the claim made in
United States ex rel. Evans v. Follette, 364 F.2d 305 (2d Cir. 1966).
If this is the case, it seems more accurate to characterize the govern-
ment's conduct as unconstitutional. The question then becomes whether
objection to this conduct can be waived. Cf. Bruton v. United States,
391 U.S. 123 (1968).
272. See, e.g., State v. Vanella, 40 Mont. 326, 106 P. 364 (1910);
State v. Frisbie, 8 Okla. Crim. 408, 127 P. 1091 (1912); In re Staff, 63
Wis. 285, 53 Am. R. 285 (1885).
273. Daniels v. Allen, reported sub nom., Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S.
443, 503 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
274. Whitus v. Balkcom, 333 F.2d 4913 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 931 (1964), discussed in text accompanying notes 211-31 supra.
275. Id. at 498 n.3. See also, Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus:
Impact of an Abortive State Proceeding, 74 HARv. L. REV. 1315, 1366.
For example, in the case of the right to a speedy trial, there is a period
of time during which the accused might find it advantageous not to
demand immediate trial. However, when the delay becomes so un-
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because of a belief that a fairer trial can be achieved with the
defect present. There may, however, be a few cases in which a
tactical advantage can be gained by a waiver. For example,
counsel may not object to a coerced confession because he be-
lieves that the confession is largely exculpatory and he desires to
keep the defendant from testifying and being exposed to cross-
examination. As long as an exception is made for this rare case,
however, it may be said that considerations of fairness do not pre-
clude a rule prohibiting waiver of unconstitutional government
action.
The fact that considerations of fairness do not impede the
adoption of the proposed waiver doctrine does not, of course,
give affirmative support to the view that the doctrine should be
adopted. Such support, however, can be found in other consid-
erations. One of these considerations is that a conviction pro-
cured by unconstitutional means remains unconstitutionally pro-
cured even though the defendant has forfeited his rights to pro-
test such a conviction. The Supreme Court in Noia was aware
of this fact, for it stated that a rule forfeiting the defendant's
remedies could not legitimize the unconstitutional conduct that
helped to procure the conviction. 27 6 The Noia Court also stated
that the writ of habeas corpus had as its primary function the
correction of unconstitutional and illegal imprisonments:
[The writ's] root principle is that in a civilized society, govern-
ment must always be accountable to the judiciary for a man's
imprisonment: if the imprisonment cannot be shown to con-
form with the fundamental requirements of law, the individual
is entitled to his immediate release.277
If an individual is entitled to his immediate release when-
ever his imprisonment does not conform with the fundamental
requirements of the law, and if a rule of waiver cannot legitimize
the illegal means by which an imprisonment is procured, it fol-
lows that the writ of habeas corpus should always remedy con-
stitutional defects without regard to waiver. The stage of the
proceedings at which a waiver occurs and the individual making
the waiver decision are irrelevant to a consideration of whether
the defendant is entitled to be released because government il-
legality has tainted his conviction.
The Noia fact situation provides a useful tool with which to
reasonable that it should be characterized as unconstitutional per se,
it no longer makes sense to say that fairness requires that an accused
be permitted to waive his right.
276. 372 U.S. at 428.
277. Id. at 402.
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examine this proposition. It will be remembered that most courts
consider the time of waiver and the individual making the waiver
as dispositive of the question of whether to overturn an ille-
gally procured conviction.278 Hence, if the fact situation in
Noia were altered to present a failure to object to the confession
at trial, rather than a failure to appeal, these courts would deny
Noia relief.2 7 9 The injustice here involved is highlighted by the
fact that these courts would free the co-defendants. It was the
spectacle of this horror, however, that led the lower federal
court in Noia to grant relief.280
In Noia, the Supreme Court did not rely on the fact that two
co-defendants had won their freedom, but certainly this was an
influencing factor in the decision.281 Yet this fact should not be
necessary to see that injustice would have resulted if Noia's re-
quest for relief were refused, regardless of whether the proce-
dural default occurred at trial or appeal. Noia's conviction
would have been procured by a coerced confession in any event
and even if he were the sole defendant he should have been re-
leased. Surely the presence of co-defendants is not the crucial
fact upon which constitutional rights rest.
Some may argue, however, that the presence of co-defend-
ants in Noia is a deceiving factor because it leads to the conclu-
sion that justice was not done. According to this view, the gov-
ernment has done all it should do when it has provided oppor-
tunities to object to its illegal conduct. After this, the interest
in convicting criminals outweighs the interest in penalizing the
government for its conduct.28 2 The deficiency in such reasoning
is bared by considering the government's procedural rules from
another angle. Rather than being designed to do all that can be
done to aid the defendant, the rules function to give the govern-
ment an opportunity to profit from its wrongs. The government
should not have profited from its unconstitutional behavior in
the first place; the procedural rules, therefore, establish traps for
the defendant which, if not avoided, enable the government to
ignore its illegality. Perhaps the clearest statement denouncing
these traps was made by a federal district court:
278. See subsection B of this section supra.
279. Cf. Brief for Petitioner at 23-24, Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391(1963). The right to appeal, and not -the right to exclude a coerced
confession, was the only issue involved in the case.
280. United States v. Fay, 300 F.2d 345, 362 (2nd Cir. 1962), af'd
on other grounds, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
281. See 372 U.S. at 441.
282. Cf. Henry v. State, 198 So. 2d 213, 218-20 (Miss. 1967) (Rodgers,
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Respondent's reference now to "strategic" failures to object
should remind us that the first choice of strategy is for the State.
It is at least open to question how far that choice should be
held to allow the proffering of illicit evidence in the hope that
resulting quandaries of defense counsel may ground proce-
dural arguments for ignoring the wrong.28 3
Of course, these procedural traps may be necessary if the
orderly processes of the criminal justice system would be ir-
reparably impaired by their removal. There is sound reason for
requiring the defendant to make his claims at the time available
for him to do so. It is unthinkable to argue that the defendant
be given two trials, a first in which he would fail to present his
constitutional claims and a second, in the event of conviction in
the first, in which he would present those claims.284 A rule for-
feiting remedies, however, only deters those who purposely seek
to impede the procedural rules, for it is plain that penalties do
not deter mere inadvertence.2 85 This realization led the Supreme
Court in Noia to hold that only a deliberate waiver would for-
feit remedies.2 803 The Court expected that very few failures to
utilize available procedure would be deliberate because there was
more to lose than to gain from such an omission. A deliberate
failure would forfeit the opportunities for appellate review and
for direct review in the Supreme Court, thus leaving habeas cor-
pus as the only avenue for relief.2s 7
It must be admitted that to abolish the waiver rule entirely
would enhance the value of deliberately by-passing available
procedures. Counsel faced with an impregnable case might deem
it tactically advantageous to deliberately forego constitutional
objections until habeas corpus proceedings years later when the
government would be incapable of obtaining a conviction. For
this reason, it is acknowledged that a new procedure must ac-
company the proposed doctrine.28 8  For purposes of the discus-
J., separate opinion), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 931 (1968).
283. United States ex rel. Vanderhorst v. La Valle, 285 F. Supp.
233, 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Cf. Curry v. Wilson, 405 F.2d 110, 116 n.6,(9th Cir. 1968) (Browning, J., concurring and dissenting): "'[I]t fol-
lows that the state cannot then rise above the defect and erase the un-
constitutional result of its trial procedure by utilizing still another of
its procedural rules to prevent the defendant from raising the ques-
tion on appeal.'
284. See Reitz, supra note 275, at 1367.
285. Cf. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317 (1963).
286. See text accompanying notes 183-87 supra.
287. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. at 433. See also Reitz, supra
note 275, at 1369.




sion here, however, it is enough to realize that the present waiver
doctrine, if applied in good faith, allows a significant number of
complaining defendants to obtain collateral relief. Therefore,
the interest in the orderly administration of the criminal justice
process cannot justify the government's use of procedural rules
in a manner that enables it to profit from its illegality, and a
new waiver doctrine would be acceptable as long as it does not
increase the number of defendants deliberately flouting avail-
able procedures.
A rule prohibiting waiver therefore finds support from the
realization that waiver cannot legitimize illegal government con-
duct and an awareness that there is no justification for permit-
ting the government to establish procedural traps for the de-
fendant. Moreover, such a rule would be more compatible with
the due process considerations that led to the recommended rule
prohibiting the waiver of counsel.2 8 9 It would be a strange doc-
trine of constitutional law that left the accused incarcerated be-
cause of counsel's "trial strategy" after insisting that counsel and
his strategy be forced on the accused. in order to assure fairness.
Since a right of personal involvement in waiver decisions was
rejected for reasons similar to that which led to the rejection of
the right to proceed pro se, protection against counsel's decisions
must be provided by other means. A rule prohibiting waiver
supplies that protection. Thus, all defendants are assured max-
imum fairness because counsel's assistance is made mandatory
and because protection is given against the unconstitutional con-
victions that may result from counsel's failure to object. The
only possibility of an unfair result for the defendant is created
by the exception that counsel must be permitted to request the
utilization of illegally procured evidence. This request may be
dictated by an unwise trial strategy, thus leaving the defendant
convicted by illegal means. The possibility of this unfair result
is somewhat reduced, however, by the procedure to be recom-
mended and by the law on ineffective assistance of counsel.290
It remains to be seen whether a rule prohibiting waiver
should apply to all types of unconstitutional government action.
Not much problem is created by the coerced confession, al-
though most courts refuse to grant defendants relief when trial
counsel has failed to make a timely objection.29 1 In speaking of
289. See generally section II supra.
290. The law on ineffective assistance of counsel is treated in sec-
tion IV infra.
291. Defendant can either allege that counsel's failure to object re-
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a coerced confession, however, the Supreme Court in Noia said:
"That complaint is... of a wrong so fundamental that it made
the whole proceeding a mere pretense of a trial and rendered
the conviction and sentence wholly void."292 The Supreme Court
has also made it clear that prejudice need not be shown by a de-
fendant who seeks to have his conviction reversed because of
the use of an involuntary confession. 293 If any government vio-
lation goes to the "very foundation of a proceeding" it would be
the use of a coerced confession. Convictions obtained by the
use of coerced confessions should not stand.
The answer is less clear when the government's unconstitu-
tional action consists of a violation of the fourth amendment.294
The petitioner in Henry had argued that due process is denied
when a conviction is supported only by evidence seized in viola-
tion of the fourth amendment and that neither the waiver doc-
trine nor the presence of competent counsel could overcome such
a defect.295 The Supreme Court held, however, that counsel, as
sulted in his receiving ineffective assistance of counsel or he can allege
that counsel could not waive his rights. For cases denying relief when
ineffective assistance of counsel was alleged, see Vizcarra-Delgadillo
v. United States, 395 F.2d 70 (9th Cir. 1968); Harried v. United States,
389 F.2d 281 (D.C. Cir. 1967); United States ex rel. Garrett v. Russell,
281 F. Supp. 104 (E.D. Pa. 1968); United States ex rel. Kern v. Maroney,
275 F. Supp. 435 (W.D. Pa. 1967). But cf. Brubaker v. Dickson, 310
F.2d 30 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 978 (1963). For cases
holding defendant bound by counsel's waiver, see In re Reynolds, 397
F.2d 131 (3d Cir. 1968); United States ex rel. Garrett v. Russell,
281 F. Supp. 104 (E.D. Pa. 1968); Prescoe v. State, 231 Md. 486, 191 A.2d
266 (1963). But cf. Ledbetter v. Warden, 368 F.2d 490 (4th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 971 (1967); United States ex rel. Gainer v. New
Jersey, 278 F. Supp. 127 (D.N.J. 1967). See also Jarrell v. Boles, 272 F.
Supp. 755, 757 (N.D. W. Va. 1967) (defendant bound by counsel's waiver
unless decision so erroneous as to amount to ineffective assistance of
counsel).
292. 372 U.S. 391, 414 (1963), quoting from Brown v. Mississippi,
297 U.S. 278 (1936). See also Curry v. Wilson, 405 F.2d 110, 116 (9th
Cir. 1968) (Browning, J., concurring and dissenting); People v. Wil-
liams, 36 Ill. 2d 194, 222 N.E.2d 321, 328 (1966) (Schaefer, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 388 U.S. 923 (1967).
293. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376 (1964); Stroble v. Cali-
fornia, 343 U.S. 181, 190 (1952).
294. For cases denying relief on the basis of ineffective assistance
of counsel for failure to object to illegally seized evidence, see Argo v.
United States, 378 F.2d 301 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 907
(1968); Harried v. United States, 389 F.2d 281 (D.C. Cir. 1967). For cases
holding defendant bound by counsel's waiver, see Mze v. Crouse, 399
F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1968); Pope v. Swenson, 395 F.2d 321 (8th Cir. 1968);
Nelson v. California, 346 F.2d 73 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 964
(1965). But cf. People v. Johnson, 38 Ill. 2d 399, 231 N.E.2d 447 (1967).
295. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 9-10; Brief for Petitioner at
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part of trial strategy, could waive objections to illegally seized
evidence. It has also been suggested that while an involuntary
confession affects the reliability of a conviction, illegally seized
evidence does not and should therefore be treated differently.
29
There are two possible answers to this contention. First, co-
erced confessions are excluded even though they may be trust-
worthy because the state is not permitted to profit by its wrong
and because it is not considered fair to compel a person to convict
himself.2 97 Second, in Kaufman v. United States,2 98 the govern-
ment argued that the fourth amendment exclusionary rule
should not be applied by a federal court granting collateral relief
to a federal prisoner because a fourth amendment claim does
not impugn the fact-finding process but only serves as a deter-
rent device. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, stating
that collateral remedies were necessary "to insure the integrity
of procedings at and before trial where constitutional rights
are at stake."299 The Court also quoted the statement in Noia
that the purpose of collateral relief is to permit challenges to
"restraints contrary to our fundamental law."300
The better approach, therefore, is to prohibit waivers of ob-
jections to both fourth and fifth amendment violations. As long
as these amendments provide protection for some defendants,
they should equally protect all. Since the waiver doctrine should
be reconsidered in toto, the Henry decision should not be allowed
to stand in the way.
It would seem that the systematic exclusion of Negroes from
juries, as in Whitus, should also be considered nonwaivable ille-
gal action. It has been suggested, however, that this unconstitu-
tional action is different from coercing a confession in that it is
possible to select the same jury from both a proper and an im-
proper array.30 1 Such a view, however, makes it possible to le-
gitimize this most abhorrent unconstitutional government be-
7, Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
296. People v. Williams, 36 Ill. 2d 194, 222 N.E.2d 321, 328 (1966)
(Schaefer, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 923 (1967).
297. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 3836 (1964); Rogers v. Richmond,
365 U.S. 534 (1961).
298. 394 U.S. 217 (1969).
299. Id. at 225. See also Lee v. Florida, 392 U.S. 378, 385-86
(1968): "Under our Constitution, no court, state or federal, may serve
as an accomplice in the willful transgression of 'the Laws of the United
States,' laws by which 'the Judges in every State [are] bound ..
300. 394 U.S. at 222.
301. Brief for Respondent at 14, Pay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
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havior, and the better approach is to find the objection non-
waivable. 302
The government, of course, can violate the constitution in
several other ways. If the means used above3 ° 3 to characterize
government action as unconstitutional are kept in mind, however,
it will be seen that the number of other violations will be small.
Many of the remaining violations involve refusing a valid de-
mand, and even under present law no waiver would be found.
The others involve conduct so patently unconstitutional that
waiver should not be allowed.
2. A Procedure to Complement the New Rule
As already indicated, it cannot be doubted that a rule pro-
hibiting waiver would increase whatever tendency there is to
flout procedural rules that govern criminal trials. Without a
new procedure to eliminate this threat, it may be doubted that
the increased fairness produced by the substantive rule is worth
the cost.
The Minnesota Supreme Court, without changing the sub-
stantive rules of waiver, has suggested a remedial procedure.
In State ex rel. Rasmussen v. Tahash,30 4 the court expressed dis-
may over the fact that so many fourth and fifth amendment is-
sues were being settled on appeal rather than at trial. This not
only indicated inefficiency in the judicial process, but it also en-
couraged disrespect for the law. The court reasoned that respect
for the legal process is engendered not by appellate corrections
of injustice but by trials that conform with constitutional re-
quirements in the first instance. 305 To correct these deficiencies,
the court established a procedure whereby at the time of ar-
raignment, or as soon thereafter as possible, the state must in-
form the court whether its case includes a confession or evidence
seized as a result of a search. The trial court then must inform
defendant's counsel and advise him of the right to a pre-trial hear-
ing in which motions to suppress can be made. If a hearing is
desired, the state has the burden of identifying the evidence
and showing that it was obtained in a constitutional manner.306
The Minnesota procedure would eliminate some of the pro-
cedural problems created by the present waiver doctrine. A de-
liberate and knowing waiver would be evidenced in the trial
302. See Reitz, supra note 275, at 1367.
303. See text accompanying notes 264-71 supra.
304. 272 Minn. 539, 141 N.W.2d 3 (1966).
305. Id. at 553, 141 N.W.2d at 13.
306. Id. at 554, 141 N.W.2d at 13-14.
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record and the habeas corpus court would not be forced to strug-
gle with the question of whether a hearing should be held. The
improvement over the present system would be significant. It
would not, however, warrant abandoning the proposed substan-
tive change. As already discussed, even a deliberate waiver does
not legalize prior, illegal government conduct, and the defendant
would still be left to pay the price of counsel's poor judgment.
Actually, the Minnesota procedvxe is not completely satis-
factory even if viewed from merely a procedural perspective. If
counsel waives the pre-trial hearing and the defendant is sub-
sequently convicted, the defendant has nothing to lose by assert-
ing in collateral proceedings that counsel's decision was such
poor judgment that it amounted to ineffective assistance of coun-
sel.307 This complaint is one of the claims most frequently as-
serted in habeas corpus3 0 8 and one of the most difficult to re-
solve. The habeas court is faced with. the dilemma of speculating
about counsel's tactics or holding a hearing in which counsel must
be called to testify. Thus, the very same procedural problems
created by present waiver doctrine 309 are also presented by the
Minnesota procedure.
The Minnesota procedure would clearly be inadequate if a
rule prohibiting waiver is adopted. Although it was argued that
a rule prohibiting waiver could not prevent trial counsel from
using illegally seized evidence if he thought it could help his
case, there is a difference between an actual desire to utilize evi-
dence and an opinion that an objection need not be made. The
Minnesota procedure does not make this distinction, thereby al-
lowing many pre-trial hearings to be waived even though counsel
would agree that the defendant would have a better chance
without the prosecutor's use of the evidence. This is not com-
patible with a rule that is supposed to prohibit waivers of ob-
jections to constitutional defects.
What is needed is a procedure to assure that the only excep-
tion to the general rule is the situation in which counsel clearly
wants the evidence introduced and that eliminates, as far as pos-
307. In State v. Fields, 279 Minn. 374, 157 N.W.2d 61 (1968), counsel
would not heed defendant's motion to suppress, thus enabling defendant
to attack counsel's effectiveness on appeal. See also State v. Williams,
282 Minn. 240, 155 N.W.2d 739 (1968).
308. The frequency with which this complaint is made was noted
as early as 1952, see Daniels v. Allen, reported sub nom. Brown v.
Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 520, 525-26 (appendix to dissenting opinion of
Frankfurter, J.).
309. See subsection C supra.
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sible, the need for collateral proceedings.3 10 This can be achieved
by making the Minnesota procedure mandatory in all trials and
by extending it to cover all evidence which may be excludable
because of a constitutional provision. The government would
be expected to explain the means used to obtain its evidence
and the defendant could be required to testify as to the accuracy
of the government's explanation. Self-incrimination problems
would be eliminated by a grant of immunity and by strict rules
limiting the questioning to the particular matter in issue. Since
the prosecutor would have the burden of establishing the manner
in which the evidence was seized, the questioning of the defend-
ant could be by the judge in much the same manner that ques-
tions are asked before accepting guilty pleas. The procedure
would culminate with the trial judge's ruling on the legality of
the evidence seized.
Such a procedure must be recognized as a step away from
the adversary system. It appears, however, that this step is a
prerequisite to satisfying the conflicting considerations of ef-
fective criminal law administration on the one hand and the
preservation of the right of the accused to be convicted only by
constitutional means on the other hand. If the preservation of
these basic rights were to depend only on counsel's initiative, the
defendant would still have the opportunity to initiate costly and
wasteful collateral proceedings by attacking counsel's effective-
ness. Counsel, of course, would be entitled to do what he could
in this pre-trial hearing, but a full hearing would be required
even if counsel did nothing.
It might be asked why such a procedure would not enable
the defendant to attack the trial judge's conclusions in collateral
proceedings. The answer is that the defendant could attack
these findings, but in most cases the attack would be in vain.
Townsend v. Sain does not require a habeas corpus hearing
when there has been a prior hearing,3 1 ' and the habeas court
would have to grant relief only in those cases in which it ap-
peared from the record that the trial judge clearly had erred.312
After the hearing, counsel would be permitted to make
known his desire to have the excluded evidence utilized. Even
310. Cf. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 469-70 (1969)
expressing the concern that issues related to guilty pleas be disposed of
at the trial level where problems of credibility and reliability of memory
can be avoided.
311. 372 U.S. 293, 313 (1963).
312. Written findings from state hearings are presumed correct. 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d) (Supp. IV, 1969).
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in this instance the pre-trial hearing serves a purpose because
it makes certain that counsel is making the decision with full
knowledge that the evidence could be excluded. The case where
counsel utilizes such evidence should be extremely rare. If the
defendant is convicted, however, the possibility of a claim of in-
effective assistance of counsel is present. Since this type of
waiver would be extremely rare, the burden on the habeas corpus
courts would not be as great as it is today. Besides, the only
two other alternatives available are to: (1) permit the trial
judge to become involved in counsel's tactical decisions and
thereby raise serious questions of the propriety of such involve-
ment or (2) prohibit waiver absolutely and thereby raise due
process questions in regard to prohibiting counsel from using evi-
dence which he believes would aid his case. The recommended
procedure is as far as one can go in remedying the deficiencies
of the present procedure.
One problem presented by the recommended procedure
is whether it also should be utilized in guilty plea cases.3 13 As
noted earlier, the guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional de-
fects 3 14 This is because a conviction after a plea of guilty nor-
mally rests on the defendant's own admission in open court that
he committed the charged acts, and not on the unconstitutional
government conduct.3 15 Nevertheless, courts can be more cer-
tain that guilty pleas are intelligently made by requiring the
prosecutor to disclose all evidence that could be subject to a con-
stitutional attack and by determining that the defendant would
still plead guilty if the evidence were found inadmissible.3 ,5 a A
pre-trial hearing on the admissibility of the evidence would be
necessary only if the defendant had doubts as to whether he
would still plead guilty.
The recommended procedure might, however, preclude the
use of a process which is deemed desirable. In some cases plea
bargaining is enhanced because of the uncertainty that exists
concerning the legality of the government's evidence. Under the
recommended system, the government would be assured a hear-
ing on the issue and thus might be inclined not to compromise
too early. This would deprive counsel of one of his bargaining
313. The Minnesota court limited its procedure to cases involving
pleas of not-guilty. State ex rel. Rasmussen v. Tahash, 272 Minn. 539,
553, 141 N.W.2d 3, 13 (1965).
314. See text accompanying note 244 supra.
315. McMann v. Richardson, 38 U.S.L.W. 4379 (May 4, 1970).
315a. Cf. People v. Taylor, 9 Mich. App. 333, 338, 155 N.W.2d 723,
726 (1968): "[T]he court shall inquire as to whether the defendant
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weapons. In light of the advantages, however, this result should
not be of significant weight. It is also open to question whether
the outcome of criminal cases should depend on uncertainty in
regard to the legality of the government's conduct.
A mandatory hearing on evidentiary matters would not, of
course, deal with all types of unconstitutional government ac-
tion. But unconstitutional government conduct outside the
sphere of the fourth and fifth amendments is much less frequent.
Much of this illegal conduct involves refusing to agree to a proper
demand, such as a demand for immediate trial or that a certain
witness be subpoenaed. In such a case, however, the demand it-
self presents the issue to the trial court. Other government ille-
gality, such as a totally unreasonable delay in beginning trial or
the systematic exclusion of Negroes from juries, would only be
remedied in collateral proceedings. The accused would, how-
ever, have to present some evidence to substantiate his claim
before being entitled to a collateral hearing. Collateral relief
against these infrequent illegalities should be a sufficient deter-
rent. If a particular illegality were found to be recurrent, how-
ever, the proper solution would be to devise a trial procedure that
would obviate the need for collateral proceedings. 316
IV. THE CLAIM OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
OF COUNSEL
The previous section advocated the adoption of a rule pro-
hibiting the waiver of objections to unconstitutional govern-
ment conduct. It was suggested that such a rule, coupled with
a mandatory pre-trial hearing to determine the constitutionality
of the government's evidence, would eliminate the procedural
problems arising from the waiver doctrine. Constitutional priv-
ileges were distinguished from rights to object to unconstitu-
tional government conduct. With respect to the waiver of con-
stitutional privileges, it may be argued that the rule giving coun-
sel authority to decide on trial tactics should govern.31 7
has made any confession to the police prior to the time of his plea of
guilty and ascertain if the confession is a reason for making the plea."
If so, a hearing on the confession is required.
316. One problem may be whether the defendant is competent to
stand trial, since a conviction while incompetent is unconstitutional.
However, to get the habeas corpus hearing defendant would have to do
more than allege his incompetency. See, e.g., Sharp v. Beto, 276 F. Supp.
871 (N.D. Tex. 1967).




The last statement, however, requires further elaboration.
Many criminal defendants claim their trials were unfair because
counsel did not follow their instructions or because counsel did
not consult them for permission to waive constitutional privi-
leges. These complaints are usually aired by means of the gen-
eral allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel. This allega-
tion, however, is not restricted to claims for personal control over
the management of the defense; attacks on counsel's preparation
for trial and representation in general are even more frequent.
The allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel has become
an anathema to post-conviction courts.31 8 A single rule of law
to dispose of all complaints cannot be found, and some com-
mentators have contended that there is no alternative but for
the post-conviction courts to accept t:he burden and try to do jus-
tice on a case by case basis:
Courts will continue to be burdened by convicts' claims that
their trial defense counsel was intrinsically inadequate and con-
scientious courts will continue their efforts to separate the meri-
torious allegations from the frivolous. No test more specific
than that embodied in the concept of a fair trial can appropri-
ately be employed in determining whether post-conviction re-
lief should follow a defense effort the claimed inadequacy of
which stemmed from counsel's intrinsic shortcomings.3 19
It seems, however, that further examination of the issues is
justified. The goal must be to establish, if possible, rules and
procedures that will maximize fairness for defendants by a proc-
ess implemented at trial rather than by a process which burdens
the post-conviction judiciary. This examination will first review
the present law on ineffective assistance of counsel and then treat
the problems of preparation, unwise tactics and ultimate re-
sponsibility for trial decisions.
A. THE TESTS FOR INEFFECTIVE AssIsTANCE OF COUNSEL
Ever since the Supreme Court denounced the "denial of ef-
fective and substantial" assistance of counsel and the appoint-
ment of counsel in a manner which precludes "the giving of ef-
318. The variety of proceedings in which the claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel can be asserted is explained in an exhaustive
treatment of the topic. See Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense Rep-
resentation As a Ground for Post-Conviction Relief in Criminal Cases,
59 Nw. U.L. REV. 289, 290 n.7 (1964). For other good treatments of the
subject, see Comment, Federal Habeas Corpus-A Hindsight View of
Trial Attorney Effectiveness, 27 LA. L. REv. 784 (1967); Comment, In-
competency and Inadequacy of Counsel as a Basis for Relief in Federal
Habeas Corpus Proceedings, 20 Sw. L.J. 136 (1966).
319. Waltz, supra note 318, at 341-42.
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fective aid,"3 20 there has been a growing volume of post-trial at-
tacks on the quality of representation afforded by counsel. The
Supreme Court has never defined "effective representation" and
the lower courts have therefore written their own definitions.
These definitions have not been liberal. The one most fre-
quently given is in negative terms: ineffective representation
by counsel is representation that is perfunctory, in bad faith, a
sham and a pretense, reducing the trial to a farce or a mockery
of justice, or representation that is shocking to the conscience.3 21
The same definition is often stated in placating words: represen-
tation that is so lacking in competence that it becomes the duty
of the court or the prosecution to observe and correct it.322
Synonymous with these are the statements that the representa-
tion must be so incompetent as to deny defendant a trial 323 or so
inadequate as to amount to no representation at all.3 24 Needless
to say, few defendants obtain relief under these tests.325
A second definition is theoretically more liberal than the
first: effective representation by counsel is "counsel reasonably
likely to render and rendering reasonably effective assistance. 3 26
320. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53, 71 (1932). The existence
of a constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel is discussed
in Waltz, supra note 318, at 293-95.
321. Williams v. Beto, 354 F.2d 698, 704 (5th Cir. 1965).
322. Id.
323. Mitchell v. United States, 259 F.2d 787 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 850 (1958).
324. Smith v. Woodley, 164 N.W.2d 594 (N.D. 1969).
325. The "mockery" test in one or another of its phraseologies has
been applied in numerous cases, including the following: Diggs v.
Welch, 148 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945);
United States v. Currier, 405 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1969); United States
ex rel. Maselli v. Reincke, 383 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1967); MeMillan v.
State, 408 F.2d 1375 (3d Cir. 1969); United States ex rel. Darcy v.
Handy, 203 F.2d 407 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 865 (1953); Williams
v. Beto, 354 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1965); Hayes v. Russell, 405 F.2d 859
(6th Cir. 1969); Tompsett v. Ohio, 146 F.2d 95 (6th Cir. 1944), cert.
denied, 324 U.S. 869 (1945); United States v. Stahl, 393 F.2d 101 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 879 (1968); Cardarella v. United States, 375
F.2d 222 (8th Ci.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 882 (1967); Vizcarra-Del-
gadillo v. United States, 395 F.2d 70 (9th Cir. 1968); Kienlen v. United
States, 379 F.2d 20 (10th Cir. 1967); People v. Hill, 70 Cal. 2d 678,
452 P.2d 329, 76 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1969); Smith v. Woodley, 164 N.W.2d
594 (N.D. 1969); Anderson v. Peyton, 209 Va. 798, 167 S.E.2d 111 (1969);
Holbert v. State, 439 S.W.2d 507 (Mo. 1969).
326, See, e.g., Brooks v. Texas, 381 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1967) (but
also finding the trial a mockery); Brubaker v. Dickson, 310 F.2d 30 (9th
Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 978 (1963); People v. McDowell, 69 Cal.




Stated differently, ineffective representation is representation
that denies the defendant a fair trial.327 This definition suffers
from ambiguity; the first construction defines effective represen-
tation in terms of itself and the second merely substitutes an
imprecise term.
A third definition is a variant of the first: ineffective rep-
resentation is representation that withdraws a crucial defense
from the case. The courts usually hinge a reversal, however, on
a finding that the trial amounted to a mockery of justice.328
Yet a fourth definition is used in the Maryland courts. This
one turns away from the "mockery" test and adopts what seems
to be a variant of the second definition: ineffective representa-
tion is representation which under ll the circumstances of the
particular case is so incompetent that the accused has not been
afforded genuine and effective legal representation.3 29  The cir-
cuity of this definition renders it meaningless.
Although the wording of the various definitions suggests
differences which might be of significance to defendants seeking
relief, one court has described the difference as more illusory
than real.330  For example, two courts, one using the mockery
standard and one using a more liberal standard, both granted
relief to a defendant whose counsel failed to raise a vital defense,
while a third court refused relief under the mockery standard.331
Thus, appellate and collateral courts seem to proceed on a case
by case basis, recognizing that the guidelines are too indefinite
to distinguish the effective from the ineffective, the competent
from the incompetent and the diligent from the indifferent..3 3 2
327. Harried v. United States, 389 F.2d 281 (D.C. Cir. 1967); State
v. Robinson, -Wash. 2d-, 450 P.2d 180 (:[969).
328. People v. Hill, 70 Cal. 2d 678, 452 P.2d 329, 76 Cal. Rptr. 225
(1969); People v. McDowell, 69 Cal. 2d 737, 447 P.2d 97, 73 Cal. Rptr.
1 (1968) (counsel did not know evidence of abnormality was admissible
in the guilt phase of trial to negate specific mental states; court used
all three tests); People v. Ibarra, 60 Cal. 2d 460, 386 P.2d 487, 34 Cal.
Rptr. 863 (1963).
329. O'Connor v. Warden, 6 Md. App. 590, 253 A.2d 434 (Ct. App.
1969).
330. Goodwin v. Swenson, 287 F. Supp. 166 (W.D. Mo. 1968).
331. Compare Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 849 (1968) (counsel failed to raise issue of penetration in a
rape case) and People v. McDowell, 69 Cal. 2d 737, 447 P.2d 97, 73 Cal.
Rptr. 1 (1968) (counsel failed to utilize evidence that could have
negated a specific mental state), with Daugherty v. Beto, 388 F.2d
810 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 986 (1968).
332. State v. Wright, 203 Kan. 54, 453 P.2d 1, 4 (1969) (Fontron, J.,
dissenting). See also Thomas v. State, -- Ind. -, 242 N.E.2d 919 (1969).
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The only certainty is that few defendants will get relief. Of
course, this is not necessarily bad, for it safely can be assumed
that most claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are frivolous.
Nevertheless, some defendants with valid claims are denied re-
lief because courts have failed to adopt a rule more meaningful
than the mockery standard. Thus, one court refused to find
ineffective assistance of counsel in a case where counsel's inade-
quate preparation precluded his learning of facts which sug-
gested the defense of insanity, even though it was the only pos-
sible defense.333 Similarly, relief was denied to a defendant even
though inadequate preparation led counsel to suggest a guilty
plea which resulted in the defendant's deportation. 33 4
The rigidity of the present approach can be traced to a num-
ber of judicial concerns. The first arises from the recognition
that the drafting of habeas corpus petitions has become some-
what of a game for those convicted of crime. There is nothing
to lose and much to gain by filing such petitions, and even a
hearing with little probability of success grants relief from prison
monotony.33 5 Cases attacking trial counsel are flooding the
courts because practically every convicted person can find points
in his trial where a different course might have been pursued.3 .3
This concern could largely be eliminated by the adoption of
the recommended rule prohibiting waiver in the context of un-
constitutional government action. Alleged unconstitutional con-
duct, such as fourth and fifth amendment violations, causes
many of the current problems. Grounds for complaint would
also be less likely if the law clearly delineated responsibility for
other trial decisions.33  Defendants could still, of course, make
a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on a cumula-
tion of counsel's other conduct, such as his failure to object to
the charge, failure to object to irrelevant testimony, failure to
argue to the jury and failure to move for a directed verdict.
But a cursory examination of the record should often suffice
333. Daugherty v. Beto, 388 F.2d 810 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 986 (1968).
334. Vizcarra-Delgadillo v. United States, 395 F.2d 70 (9th Cir.
1968).
335. Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 889 (1945).
336. Tafoya v. United States, 386 F.2d 537 (10th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 1034 (1968); Brubaker v. Dickson, 310 F.2d 30 (9th
Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 978 (1963); Johnson v. United States,
267 F.2d 813 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 889 (1959); Mitchell v.
United States, 259 F.2d 787 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 850 (1958).
337. See subsection E infra.
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to declare these decisions, even if egregious, harmless, and a curt
dismissal rather than a hearing should greet the petitioner. This
concern, therefore, could no longer lend support to the rigid ap-
proach taken by courts.
A second concern is that a more liberal approach would in-
duce counsel to make deliberate errors so their clients would
ultimately win relief.338 This would be less likely under the
recommended waiver doctrine since it would be impossible to err
on the typically crucial issues. Counsel would have to err pur-
posely on many minor matters before his representation would
be ineffective. Intentional delinquency on counsel's part, how-
ever, can and should be dealt with separately. When counsel
admits such misbehavior, he should be disbarred.33 9 When claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel succeed more than once against
a particular attorney, the court should examine his competency
to continue representing criminal defendants. The reluctance to
punish attorneys should not be used to engender a reluctance to
grant defendants relief when merited; rather, courts should rec-
ognize that this supervision of counsel's performance is necessary
to make the system work. The approach would not be unduly
harsh on counsel, but it would discourage any inclination to
present less than the best defense.
Finally there is the fear that hindsight would reveal tactical
errors over which conscientious attorneys might differ.3 40 This
fear is negated by its own statement; if conscientious attorneys
would differ, it is impossible to concLude that "errors" necessitat-
ing relief were made.
B. STATUS OF DEFENSE COUNSEL AS AFFECTING THE TEST
Some courts make it almost impossible for a defendant to
obtain relief from inadequate assistance of counsel when counsel
is retained rather than appointed.34 11 Two reasons are usually
given for the distinction: (1) counsel is the employed agent
338. Cross v. United States, 392 F.2d 360 (8th Cir. 1968); United
States ex rel. Maselli v. Reincke, 383 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1967); Bru-
baker v. Dickson, 310 F.2d 30 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S.
978 (1963).
339. See, e.g., Cross v. United States, 392 F.2d 360 (8th Cir. 1968).
340. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Maselli v. Reincke, 383 F.2d
129, 132 (2d Cir. 1967).
341. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Darcy v. Handy, 203 F.2d 407(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 865 (1953); Weatherman v. Peyton, 287
F. Supp. 819 (W.D. Va. 1968). Contra, United States ex rel. Masselli v.
Reincke, 383 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1967).
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of the accused, and an agent's actions bind the principal and
(2) the fourteenth amendment is directed to state action, and
state action is not involved when counsel is retained. But when
the representation of retained counsel is so obviously ineffective
that it becomes the duty of the court to correct it, state action
is involved and relief is granted.342 This, in effect, is an applica-
tion of the "mockery" test. Hence, whatever test is used for ap-
pointed counsel, courts recognizing this distinction use the mock-
ery test for retained counsel. Relief from even the most serious
errors cannot, however, be given unless the errors are such that
they would come to the attention of the trial judge.
Both reasons for the distinction have been adequately re-
pudiated by legal scholars.343 Furthermore, the state action the-
ory is rejected by implication in the proposition that due process
may require representation to be forced on the accused.34" Man-
datory representation is justified only if the government has
an interest in seeing that no man is punished without a fair
trial. If the government has such an interest, then the status of
defense counsel is irrelevant.
The distinction should be abolished for a final, practical rea-
son. Courts which purport to make the distinction often use the
same rigid standards when counsel is appointed. 345 Moreover,
some courts are not at all consistent in applying the tests.3 46 It
makes little sense to try to maintain the distinction when the
same test is used in all cases or when it is not clear what test
is used in any particular case.
C. INADEQUATE PREPARATION BY COUNSEL
In applying the tests for ineffective assistance of counsel,
courts occasionally distinguish errors committed as a result of
342. See generally Waltz, supra note 318.
343. See, e.g., id. See also Polur, Retained Counsel, Assigned Coun-
sel: Why the Dichotomy?, 55 A.B.A.J. 254 (1969).
344. See section II supra.
345. Third Circuit: Compare United States ex rel. Darcy v. Handy,
203 F.2d 407 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 865 (1953), with MeMiclan
v. New Jersey, 408 F.2d 1375 (3d Cir. 1969) (rigid test for appointed coun-
sel-to find that counsel is appointed one must read the state report, 65
N.J. Super. 478, 168 A.2d 81 (1961)). Fifth Circuit: Compare Bell v.
Alabama, 367 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 916 (1967)
(no distinction), with Brooks v. Texas, 381 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1967)
(liberal test for appointed counsel) and Atilus v. United States, 406
F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1969) (harsher rule applied to retained counsel).
346. Ninth Circuit: Brubaker v. Dickson, 310 F.2d 30 (9th Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 978 (1963) (liberal test for appointed coun-
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counsel's faulty judgment from errors committed because of
counsel's failure to investigate and prepare the defense.347 The
distinction is a variant of the rule that the accused is bound by
counsel's choice of trial tactics; a choice of tactics is absent when
counsel has failed to prepare. Whatever the merits of the dis-
tinction, the problem of counsel's failure to investigate and pre-
pare a defense is a real one.
A frequent assertion is that counsel has not spent adequate
time in consultation with the accused. Often there has been only
one meeting of short duration34 8 or a few meetings which to-
gether amount to little consultation. 3 9 Such meager preparation
might well result in a failure to advance available defenses. For
example, in Daugherty v. Beto3 50 the defendant's criminal rec-
ord dated to age 15. During previous imprisonments he had am-
putated a finger, cut his heel tendons seven times, slashed his
wrists twice and broken his arm. He had received up to 30 shock
treatments and had been committed to a hospital. In the present
case he was charged with robbery and kidnapping. Counsel
spent no more than 20 minutes with him before he entered a plea
of guilty to a lesser charge. The defendant then was sentenced
to 75 years imprisonment. The court felt the "mockery" test had
not been met, but Judge Rives, in dissent, noted that the only
possible defense was insanity and that a 20 minute conference
would not have been enough time for the defendant even to re-
late the history of his trouble. Judge Rives asked whether em-
ployed counsel in a capital case would have spent so little time.35 1
The fault in Daugherty and in many other cases does not lie
with counsel but with the trial court. Counsel frequently is not
sel); Eaton v. United States, 384 F.2d 235 (9th Cir. 1967) (liberal test
for retained counsel); Vizcarra-Delgadillo v. United States, 395 F.2d
70 (1968) (mockery test for appointed counsel).
347. E.g., Brubaker v. Dickson, 310 F.2d 30 (9th Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 372 U.S. 978 (1963).
348. See, e.g., Doughty v. Beto, 396 F.2d 128 (5th Cir. 1968) (con-
ference 15 minutes before pleading gtilty); Daugherty v. Beto, 388
F.2d 810 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 986 (1968) (15 to 20
minutes before pleading); Brooks v. Texas, 381 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1967)
(15 to 20 minutes, three days before trial); Townsend v. Bomar, 351
F.2d 499 (6th Cir. 1965) (one hour); United States ex rel. Williams v.
Brierly, 291 F. Supp. 912 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (three to 15 minutes).
349. See, e.g., Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 849 (1968) (three meetings, longest 30 minutes); Brubaker v.
Dickson, 310 F.2d 30 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 978 (1963)
(three meetings, total of one hour).
350. 388 F.2d 810 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 986 (1968)51. Id. at 814-!7,
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appointed until minutes before the accused is called upon to
plead. The Fourth Circuit, however, has adopted an approach
that merits the support of other courts. Whenever counsel is
not appointed promptly so that he may have a reasonable time
to prepare the defense, ineffective assistance of counsel is pre-
sumed unless the state proves that no prejudice has occurred. 35 2
The same court found that an appointment of two public defend-
ers to represent 58 defendants in a three month term of court
raised a presumption of prejudice.35 3
Some courts, however, have persisted in holding that an
appointment immediately before trial is permissible.354 One of
the problems facing the courts is the shortage of attorneys avail-
able for appointment in criminal cases. Capacity determines doc-
trine, except for those courts willing to be idealistic.355  This
problem will be magnified by the proposed rule that insists on
representation in all cases. Yet, it must be recognized that due
process requires representation in many of the cases lacking rep-
resentation today, and this need for representation cannot be
satisfied adequately and efficiently except by requiring counsel
in all cases.3 5 6 Therefore, it is imperative that the means be
found to provide counsel if ours is to be a system of equal jus-
tice. In the meantime, local bar associations and the judiciary
should work out standards providing for a minimum period of
time for preparation which, if not provided, would raise a pre-
sumption of prejudice. As the system solves the problem of the
availability of counsel this period could be lengthened. Even
before this is done, all courts could find that an appointment on
the day of trial, or on the eve of trial, is presumptively ineffective.
Once a procedure is adopted that guarantees adequate time
to prepare, the burden is on counsel to use his time adequately.
352. Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
849 (1968).
353. Id. See also United States ex rel. Mathis v. Rundle, 394 F.2d
748 (3rd Cir. 1968 (attorney appointed on eve of trial, court adopted
Fourth Circuit approach but found presumption overcome by counsel's
testimony that he was unable to say he was unprepared); United States
ex rel. Williams v. Brierly, 291 F. Supp. 912 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (attorney
assigned to court room with a list of cases for the day).
354. Daugherty v. Beto, 388 F.2d 810 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 986 (1968); United States v. Trigg, 392 F.2d 860 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 391 U.S. 961 (1968).
355. Compare United States exc rel. Adams v. Rundle, 294 F. Supp.
194 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (must be sensitive to case load of public defenders),
with Thomas v. State, - Ind. -, 242 N.E.2d 919 (1969) (defendant's rights
cannot be determined by case load of public defenders).
356. See section II, subsections D & E supra.
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Failure to do so, however, could still result in a collateral attack
which necessitates a hearing. For example, counsel subjected
himself to this attack in Vizcarra-Deigadillo v. United States357
by not investigating the circumstances of a confession of ques-
tionable validity, by not interviewing a prosecution witness un-
der circumstances which suggested that he would not testify and
by making an incomplete investigation of the law which left
him unaware that a guilty plea would mandate deportation. The
court's finding that the defendant had not met the burden of
proving ineffective assistance of counsel should "shock the con-
science" of the fair-minded jurist.35 8
The Delgadillo case does raise the issue of what test should
be applied to meet these kinds of allegations. It would appear
that in a system dedicated to justice, but limited by human
frailities, no more and no less should be demanded than a fair
trial. The mockery test, with its approach that something, albeit
small, is better than nothing, cannot be what the right to counsel
is all about. The "fair trial" approach, however, leaves the stand-
ard subjective and indefinite and it is out of such subjectivity
and indefiniteness in the law that collateral attacks are spun.
An approach is needed to guarantee adequate preparation in the
first instance. It is difficult, however, to devise means for eval-
uating counsel's preparation before trial. Adequate preparation
depends on the prosecutor's evidence, the complexity of the case,
the defendant's background and myriad other factors which are
not known to the trial judge. The best that can be achieved is
a means of avoiding the necessity for further hearing if counsel's
preparation is attacked after conviction. This can be accom-
plished by requiring counsel to file a confidential worksheet
with the trial judge before trial. This worksheet would specify
the time spent in consultation and other investigation, the wit-
nesses interviewed and not interviewed and other work done
on the case. If a collateral attack on counsel's effectiveness were
made, this sheet would accompany the record to the appellate
court and would often exonerate coumsel and obviate the need
for a hearing.
There should be no objection to providing such a worksheet.
First, as indicated, a worksheet would make counsel's appearance
357. 395 F.2d 70 (9th Cir. 1968).
358. Accord, Bell v. Alabama, 367 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 916 (1967). But cf. Thomas v. State, - Ind. -, 242
N.E.2d 919 (1969) (beginning investigation of witnesses on eve of trial
will not suffice).
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in a post-conviction hearing unnecessary. Second, the informa-
tion provided would be the same as that required of counsel when
he is called to testify at post-conviction hearings, and it would
be provided when memory was not dulled by the lapse of time.
Finally, in light of the frequent attacks on counsel's effective-
ness, many diligent counsel keep similar records in their files;
there should be no objection to providing a confidential copy to
the court for part of the record of the case.
A worksheet, of course, will not always reveal inadequate
preparation. For example, if counsel advises a guilty plea not
knowing that the rule of legal insanity has been changed, 5 9 the
worksheet is not likely to reveal the defect. This is the type of
case, however, that collateral proceedings should remedy. The
approach recommended here should help accomplish the goal of
eliminating frivolous claims.
D. MISTAKS iN IANAGING TmE CASE
1. Not-Guilty Plea Cases
Closely related to the charge of inadequate preparation, and
often inextricably bound to it, is the charge that counsel has
made serious tactical blunders. The charges are inextricable
when counsel's lack of preparation prevents possible defenses
from being presented, as when counsel did not know that the
rule of legal insanity was changed, that certain evidence was ad-
missible to negate specific intent or that deportation was manda-
tory punishment for conviction.3 60 The charges are extricable
when adequately prepared counsel has made decisions which
hindsight proves may have been faulty. For example, without
defendant's disagreement, counsel may have decided not to call
a witness who might have established the defense of entrap-
ment38 ' or may have decided not to raise the defense of insanity
when psychiatric reports suggested an abnormality.3 2 Counsel
may also have interrogated defendant at trial about prior indict-
ments-for the prosecutor to have done so would be reversible
error-or may have asked a revolting question of a rape vic-
359. See Kienlen v. United States, 379 F.2d 20 (1Oth Cir. 1967) (de-
fendant changed plea from not guilty by reason of insanity to guilty
after being incorrectly advised by counsel as to insanity test).
360. See subsection C supra.
361. See, e.g., Andrews v. United States, 403 F.2d 341 (9th Cir.
1968).




tim.3 63 Finally, counsel's representation may be attacked on a
number of minor points, each insignificant by itself.
The previously discussed concerns underlying the rigid defi-
nitions of ineffective assistance of counsel are most valid here.
It is difficult to establish a pre-trial or trial procedure to deal
with the many decisions and actions that may be attacked in
subsequent proceedings. In spite of this difficulty, it is unjusti-
fiable to provide the accused representation which is only mar-
ginally better than no representation. Such representation is
likewise unjustifiable if due process makes counsel's assistance
mandatory.
The problem of post-conviction proceedings is real enough to
necessitate the clear enunciation of a standard by which inef-
fective assistance of counsel can be determined. It will be re-
called that one of the concerns impeding the liberalization of
the law is that hindsight would reveal errors over which con-
scientious lawyers would differ. Since the government's only
obligation is to assure a fair trial, however, this fear need cause
no concern. A fair trial has not been denied when counsel has
pursued a course of action over which conscientious lawyers
might differ. The accused cannot complain provided there is a
reasonable basis for counsel's actions.
Two findings should be made before granting relief for in-
effective assistance of counsel: (1) that there was no reasonable
basis for counsel's action and (2) that the error was serious
enough to have probably affected the outcome.3 64  The second
criterion is a harmless error rule. If counsel's unreasonable ac-
tions are probably harmless, the d.efendant should have no
grounds for complaint. A probability, rather than a possibility,
of harm should be required because the former is more realistic
in a system dependent on human beings.3 65 In many, if not all,
trials, counsel may do something whdch could be characterized
as unreasonable; if a possibility of harm sufficed for reversal,
finality would rarely be achieved. On the other hand, our sys-
tem should be capable of providing lawyers competent enough
363. State v. Cutcher, 17 Ohio App. 2d 107, 244 N.E.2d 767 (Ct.
App. 1969) (counsel's assistance denounced as a flagrant instance of
farcical inefficiency).
364. Cf. Commonwealth ex tel. Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa.
599, 235 A.2d 349 (1967).
365. In cases of constitutional errors, the Supreme Court has re-
quired only a possibility of harm, see Chapman v. California, 386 U.S.
18 (1967). There is a difference, however, in deterring illegal govern-
ment conduct and deterring mistakes on the part of counsel.
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so as not to err so seriously that the outcome is probably affected.
It may yet be contended that the test is imprecise and diffi-
cult to apply. It is, however, more precise than the ones cur-
rently used. The most liberal of the current tests requires only
that counsel render reasonably effective assistance or, alterna-
tively, that counsel not deprive the defendant of a fair trial,306
whereas the test suggested here explicitly states criteria by which
counsel's effectiveness and the fairness of the proceedings can
be determined. Each of counsel's actions that are challenged
would be examined for reasonableness. Those that are found
unreasonable would be examined singularly and collectively to
determine their probable effect on the outcome. The two cri-
teria do indeed leave some room for speculation, but courts have
had experience with these standards. The advantage over the
present tests is that it would be clear to courts how to proceed
in reaching a conclusion.
While the suggested test liberalizes the law, it also places
a heavy burden of proof on the defendant. In short, the de-
fendant's burden should be light enough to assure fairness but
heavy enough to deter frivolous, time-consuming claims in col-
lateral proceedings. Such a burden is just, for a system depend-
ent on human minds cannot be perfect. But it can and should be
fair.
2. Guilty Plea Cases
Counsel's assistance is often criticized when the defendant
has been persuaded to plead guilty. For example, a defendant
may complain that counsel was not adequately aware of the law
when he advised a guilty plea3 67 or that counsel advised such a
plea knowing that the defendant did not remember committing
the crime.36 8 These issues can be resolved by the same stand-
ards; relief should be granted only if counsel committed an un-
reasonable error without which he probably would have recom-
366. See text at notes 326-27 supra.
367. See, e.g., Kienlen v. United States, 379 F.2d 20 (10th Cir.
1967).
368. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Garrett v. Russell, 281 F. Supp.
104 (E.D. Pa. 1968); People v. Garrison, 108 Ill. App. 2d 77, 246 N.E.2d
465 (App. Ct. 1969). Practically all courts permit the trial of defendants
who cannot remember committing crimes, see Recent Case, 52 IowA L.
REV. 339 (1966); Note, Amnesia: A Case Study in the Limits of Particular
Justice, 71 YALE L.J. 109 (1961). It does not follow, however, that
because a defendant is found competent to stand trial he should be per-
mitted to plead guilty. There is a split of opinion as to whether the
19701
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
mended a plea of not guilty. The criteria would be more diffi-
cult to administer here; but again, it seems that they are better
than the standards now used.
A different situation is presented where improper conduct
on the part of counsel induces a guilty plea. Counsel may, for
example, play the role of amicus curiae instead of advocate and
induce a guilty plea because he believes that the defendant
should not be at large. 69 Perhaps counsel may have misrepre-
sented to the defendant that a bargain had been negotiated.870
In such cases, relief should be granted and counsel should be
warned that repeated performances can result in disbarment.
Cases such as these, however, will probably be rare.
E. RESPONSIBILITY FOR TRIAL DEcIsIoii's
The recommended test for ineffective assistance of counsel
cannot determine the allocation of responsibility for trial deci-
sions. For example, the defendant may allege that counsel was
ineffective because counsel disregarded the defendant's orders
or because counsel failed to consult with the defendant before
making trial decisions. Only a delineation of responsibility can
remove this issue from the dockets of the post-conviction judi-
ciary. Responsibility for the waiver of objections to unconsti-
tutional government action, however, would no longer be an
issue if the proposed rule prohibiting waiver of such action is
adopted.87'1
1. Pleading and Appealing
The decision to plead guilty is considered to be outside the
sphere of trial strategy even by those courts which adhere most
strictly to the rule that counsel and not the accused must make
trial decisions. 372 The Supreme Court's decision in Brookhart V.
accused must be convinced of his guilt before a guilty plea is accepted.
Compare McCoy v. United States, 363 F.2d 306 (D.C. Cir. 1966), with
United States v. Rogers, 289 F. Supp. 726 ,D. Conn. 1968) (counsel must
exercise scrupulous care to see that an innocent man does not plead
guilty).
369. People v. Heirens, 4 l. 2d 131, 122 N.E.2d 231 (1954).
370. State v. Tunender, 182 Neb. C1, 157 N.W.2d 165 (1968).
371. See section III supra.
372. Nelson v. People, 346 F.2d 73, 81 n.7 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 964 (1965); People v. Williams, 36 l. 2d 194, 222 N.E.2d 321,
325 (1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 923 (1967). See also United States
ex rel. Kern v. Maroney, 275 F. Supp. 425 (W.D. Pa. 1967); Common-
wealth v. Garrett, 425 Pa. 594, 229 A.2d 922 (1967).
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Janis373 supports this view. In that case, trial counsel agreed
to submit the issue of guilt to determination by a prima facie
case, a procedure that the trial judge recognized as tantamount
to a guilty plea. The crucial fact relied on by the Court in re-
versing the decision was the defendant's statement to the trial
judge that he was in no way pleading guilty.3a 4
Further support for the view that the accused must person-
ally decide to plead guilty is found in two recent cases decided
by the Supreme Court. The Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure require the trial judge to personally address the defend-
ant to ascertain whether his guilty plea is voluntarily and un-
derstandingly made,375 and the Court in McCarthy v. United
States376 held that there must be strict compliance with this pro-
cedure even though counsel is present at the time of pleading.
More recently, the Court held it to be a constitutional requirement
that state and federal judges alike personally address the de-
fendant to determine the voluntariness of his guilty plea.3 77
It is only fair to prohibit counsel from forcing the defendant
to plead guilty since a plea ends all controversy and waives all
nonjurisdictional defects.378 There may, of course, be tactical
reasons for pleading guilty. For example, counsel may be able
to negotiate a good plea bargain in a situation where a trial con-
viction would be most severe.379 If counsel had the authority
to decide on the plea, the defendant could be prevented from
harming himself. Such a result, however, would be completely
contrary to our notions of fairness. Our system presumes inno-
cence until a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt by a
proper trier of fact; the system could not tolerate permitting
counsel to usurp the role of the trier of fact. At most, counsel
can be permitted to advise the defendant to plead guilty, but
counsel cannot be permitted to decide for the defendant.
The more interesting question is whether counsel should
be permitted to enter a plea of not guilty over the defendant's
protest. At present, the defendant does not have an absolute
right to plead guilty. The federal rules direct the trial judge not
to accept a guilty plea unless he is satisfied that it is made with
373. 384 U.S. 1 (1966).
374. Id. at 7.
375. FED. R. Cam. P. 11 (1968).
376. 394 U.S. 459 (1968).
377. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
378. Id. at 242.
379. E.g., Doughty v. Beto, 396 F.2d 128 (5th Cir. 1968) (prosecutor
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an understanding of the nature of the charge and the conse-
quences of the plea. Moreover, the trial judge is prohibited
from entering a judgment upon a guiltyj plea unless he is satisfied
that there is a factual basis for the plea.380 Due process consid-
erations undoubtedly underlie this rule; it is preferred in our
system to prevent the conviction of innocent persons. Beyond
these considerations, however, there is no reason to prohibit the
defendant from pleading guilty.38' The issue, therefore, is to de-
fine the role that counsel should play when he believes the de-
fendant's guilty plea is not voluntaiy, understanding or made
with an underlying factual basis. It is probably true that counsel
can assess these factors better than the trial judge because of
counsel's opportunity to study the case and communicate with
the accused. Nevertheless, due to the strong sentiment that exists
for encouraging the acknowledgment of guilt, it is better not to
give counsel the power to override the defendant's desire to
plead guilty.38 2 Counsel should instead be limited to assisting
the trial judge so that the latter can better fulfill his responsi-
bility.
The recommended approach woultd provide an outlet for the
commendable concerns of counsel that led to the appeal in Peo-
ple v. Whitfield.s 3 The prosecutor had offered to reduce the
charge from murder to manslaughter with a recommendation
of probation if the defendant pleaded guilty. Counsel, thinking
he would win the case, declined the offer without communicating
it to the defendant. Defendant was convicted and sentenced to
a maximum of 18 years' imprisonment. The Illinois Supreme
Court, by positing the non sequitur that the defendant must
have the right to plead guilty if he has the right to plead not
guilty, concluded that counsel should have informed the defend-
ant of the offer. The court was certainly correct in holding that
counsel should have communicated with the accused. A better
dropped recidivist charges which would have mandated a life sentence
in exchange for defendant's guilty plea).
380. FED. R. Calm. P. 11 (1968). See also Lynch v. Overholser,
369 U.S. 705, 719 (1962) which contains dicta to the effect that there is
no constitutional right to have a guilty-plea accepted.
381. "If the plea is thus determined to be knowing, voluntary, and
accurate, there is no basis for giving the court discretion to refuse to
accept the plea." ABA STANDAms RmATiNG TO PLEAS oF GuLTY
§ 1.1 (a), Commentary (1968).
382. But cf. People v. Merkouris, 45 Cal. 2d 540, 297 P.2d 999 (1956)(court erred in permitting defendant, over counsel's protest, to with-
draw plea of not guilty by reason of insani.ty).
383. 40 Ill. 2d 308, 239 N.E.2d 850 (1968).
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conclusion, however, would have added that counsel's duty was
to explain to the trial judge why he felt a guilty plea was inap-
propriate.
The result may still seem harsh to some observers. One can
imagine counsel in Whitfield convincing the trial judge that there
was no factual basis for a guilty plea to the recommended charge
and the defendant subsequently being convicted on the original
charge. The problem, however, is a product of the negotiated
plea process. The hypothetical is unsatisfactory only if one as-
sumes that a guilty plea should be accepted merely because it
has been induced by a promise of leniency. To the extent that
it is a valid policy of the law to reject guilty pleas which may be
inaccurate, 384 the hypothetical represents a tough break, but not
injustice.
The decision to make or forego an appeal is similar to the
decision to plead guilty; the defendant and not counsel must make
it. On the basis of Noia, 85 it has been held that counsel has no
right to forego an appeal without consulting the defendant,388
even if counsel has an objective in mind.387 This is consistent
with the Supreme Court's more recent holding in Anders v. Cali-
forni a 8 8 that counsel cannot merely conclude that an appeal is
frivolous and so inform the court. If defendant wishes to appeal,
counsel must submit a brief referring to any arguable points
whether or not the appeal seems frivolous to him. It is clear,
therefore, that counsel cannot prevent the defendant from ap-
pealing.38 9
2. Submitting the Case on a Transcript
Defense counsel will occasionally arrange with the prosecu-
tor for the case to be submitted on the transcript of the prelimi-
nary hearing. If the right to produce evidence at trial is pre-
served, the shortcut procedure amounts only to a waiver of the
right to cross-examine witnesses. If the right to produce evidence
384. See ABA STA=ARs, supra note 381, § 1.6, Commentary.
385. 372 U.S. 391 (1963). See text accompanying notes 202-09
supra.
386. Wainwright v. Simpson, 360 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1966).
387. See United States ex rel. Maselli v. Reincke, 383 F.2d 129(2d Cir. 1967), where counsel hoped to better his chances of successfully
negotiating pending and unrelated charges.
388. 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
389. If the sentencing judge were to advise the defendant of the
right to appeal, collateral proceedings to determine the defendant's
'"mowing" waiver would be unnecessary.
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is not preserved, however, the procedure is tantamount to a
guilty plea.
In general, the decision to cross-examine a particular witness
belongs to counsel.3 90 The decision to submit the case on a tran-
script of testimony, however, involves more than a decision to
forego cross-examination of a particular witness; it involves a
complete waiver of the right to cross-examine. In Brookhart V.
Jans,391 counsel's decision to submft the matter on a prima
facie case over defendant's express denial that he was pleading
guilty was held not binding. The framing of the legal issue by
the Court, however, makes it unclear whether the right to plead,
the right of confrontation, or both rights were found personal
to the accused: "whether counsel has power to enter a plea
which is inconsistent with his client's expressed desire and
thereby waive his constitutional right to plead not guilty and
have a trial in which he can confront and cross-examine the wit-
nesses against him."3 92 Later in the opinion Henry was distin-
guished and found not to support the idea that counsel could
"enter in the name of his client another plea-whatever the
label-which would shut off the defendant's constitutional right
to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him which
he would have an oportunity to do under a plea of not guilty. 3 93
In the more recent case of Boykin v. Alabama, 94 the Court
noted that a guilty plea waives the right to confront one's accusers
and that such a waiver could not be presumed from a silent
record. Hence, if the record must clearly establish a voluntary
guilty plea before a waiver of the right to confrontation can be
found, strong support is gained for the view that a complete
waiver of the right of confrontation cannot be made by counsel.
The ordinary case, however, does not involve an expressed
disagreement with counsel; usually counsel, after a plea of not
guilty, states in defendant's presence that the case will be sub-
mitted on the transcript. In this situation, most courts find the
defendant to have acquiesced in the decision.3 95 In People v.
390. Brookhart v. Janes, 384 U.S. 1, 8 (1966) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring); People v. Modesto, 66 Cal. 2d 695, 427 P.2d 788, 59 Cal. Rptr. 124,
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1009 (1967).
391. 384 U.S. 1 (1966).
392. Id. at 7.
393. Id. at 8.
394. 395 U. S. 238 (1969).
395. Poole v. Fitzharris, 396 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1968); Wilson v.
Gray, 345 F.2d 282 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 919 (1965). Cf.
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Wheeler,8 96 however, the defendant's silent acquiescence lasted
only until the court pronounced him guilty. The verdict was
met by defendant's shouts of shocked indignation that he had not
had a trial. The court found the case indistinguishable from
Brookhart, but emphasized that it was not expressing doubt on
the validity of the rule that silent acquiescence constitutes
waiver.
The above approach favors the defendant who has the temer-
ity to make a courtroom outburst. If the defendant is given
authority to make the decision when disagreement with counsel
is made known to the court, he should also be given the right to
make the decision when the disagreement is not aired. The
crucial question is whether the defendant should have the right
to decide the matter at all. The answer must depend on the
particular waivers involved in the stipulation. The prima facie
case in Brookhart involved a waiver of the rights to testify, to
call witnesses and to confront witnesses. As the trial judge had
remarked, it was in effect a plea of guilty.397 Since the guilty
plea is considered personal to the accused, the prima facie case
should involve the same procedural safeguards as does the plea
of guilty. In cases where submitting the issue on a transcript
does not amount to a guilty plea but only waives the right of
confrontation, however, the better approach is to recognize that
counsel may be making a tactical decision for the defendant's
own good. For example, counsel may believe that the force of
damaging testimony can be blunted by use of this procedure.3 98
Nevertheless, because such a drastic and complete waiver of a
constitutional privilege is involved, the trial judge should explain
the procedure to the defendant and ascertain whether he ap-
proves. If the defendant does not approve, the burden should
be on counsel to prove that a tactical advantage is to be gained.
This allocation of the burden is justifiable since the defendant
has the right to decide to plead not guilty399 and because a plea
of not guilty connotes a full trial to the average person. The
stipulated transcript case involves such a diminution of the nor-
mal incidents of a full trial that it should not be allowed over
People v. Chamberlin, 242 Cal. App. 2d 594, 51 Cal. Rptr. 679 (1966).
See also the cases cited in Waltz, infra note 398, at 322 n.190.
396. 260 Cal. App. 2d 522, 67 Cal. Rptr. 245 (1966).
397. 384 U.S. at 6.
398. Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense Representation as a Ground
for Post-Conviction Relief in Criminal Cases, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 289, 322
(1964).
399. See text accompanying notes 372-79 supra.
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the defendant's dissent unless counsel can clearly establish a
tactical advantage. This simple rule and procedure would in-
crease fairness for defendants as a whole and would establish a
record that would obviate the need for subsequent post-trial hear-
ings in which a decision on the defendant's consent or lack of
consent would be speculative.
3. Calling Particular Witnesses
One of the complaints most frequently heard is that counsel
failed to call a suggested witness. Although the sixth amend-
ment gives defendants the right to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses, the almost unanimous approach has been
to place on counsel, who has the legal acumen to determine if a
witness will be helpful or harmful, the responsibility for deciding
which witnesses to call.400 It is, however, difficult to attack
counsel's decision after the pressure of decision-making is over.401
Nevertheless, a different case is presented when the accused can
show that the desired witness' testimony would have gone to the
heart of the matter or that counsel's refusal to comply prevented
an available defense from being presented. 40 2 Likewise, a dif-
ferent case is presented when counsel does not even investigate
the leads supplied to him.40 3
It has also been suggested that a different result would be
reached if the defendant were to tell the trial court that counsel
400. Gravenmier v. United States, 399 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1968);
United States v. Meek, 388 F.2d 936 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S.
951 (1968); Eaton v. United States, 384 F.2d 235 (9th Cir. 1967); United
States ex rel. Darcy v. Handy, 203 F.2d 407 (3rd Ci.), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 865 (1953); Coleman v. Peyton, 287 F. Supp. 892 (W.D. Va.
1968); State v. Crepeault, - Vt. -, 252 A.2d 534 (1969); Smith v.
Woodley, 164 N.W.2d 594 (N.D. 1969).
401. Smith v. Woodley, 164 N.W.2d 594 (N.D. 1969) (also expressing
the fear that such second-guessing would discourage counsel from rep-
resenting defendants).
402. In United States ex rel. Jefferson v. Follette, 396 F.2d 862
(2nd Cir. 1968) counsel would not subpoena a witness for a coram
nobis proceeding to determine the voluntariness of a confession. This
and other failures were sufficient for the court to conclude that the de-
fendant was prevented from raising the coercion issue. Cf. Eaton v.
United States, 384 F.2d 235 (9th Cir. 19137) (hearing not necessary be-
cause facts not alleged to show testimony would have helped defense).
403. Thomas v. State, - Ind. -, 242 N.E.2d 919 (1969) (calling
one of the suggested witnesses the night before trial was not adequate
investigation). Contra, State v. Bentley, 45 N.J. Super. 193, 134 A.2d
445 (1957) (counsel need not interview a witness unless his judgment
indicates he should).
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refused to subpoena desired witnesses.40 4 Such a procedure dis-
criminates against those defendants who, for one reason or an-
other, are reluctant to bring their discontent to the trial judge's
attention. If the defendant who disagrees with counsel can pre-
vail by notifying the court of the disagreement, then the less
aggressive defendant should also prevail. Only the need for fi-
nality can justify such a distinction, but that need can be met
by a procedural change. The trial judge, out of the jury's pres-
ence, could ask the defendant at the conclusion of the testimony
whether he wanted to call other witnesses. The judge could also
explain that failure to speak would preclude relief on the basis
of a contrary assertion at a later date. A negative answer from
the defendant would eliminate the need for any collateral hear-
ings on this issue.
An affirmative answer squarely presents the issue of ulti-
mate responsibility for the decision. It is fair to protect the ac-
cused from his own ignorance and arrogance but it is not fair
to prevent him from presenting his case. A just result can be
achieved by having the disagreement presented for the record
and by having the trial judge make findings of fact. In this
situation, however, unlike that created by submitting the case
on a transcript, most of the incidents of a full trial are not being
waived. Therefore, counsel's decision should prevail unless the
defendant can show that the decision is unreasonable. This, of
course, requires the trial judge to make a value judgment on
counsel's tactics, a result not generally favored. Indeed, it has
been said that placing such responsibility on the trial judge would
affect the entire trial procedure:
If a trial judge were to understand that after the trial he would
in all probability be called upon to determine whether each or
any of the trial steps taken by the defense was or was not
"ineffective", his whole attitude toward and conduct of the trial
would change.405
Such involvement, it is feared, would destroy the impartiality
of the judge. The fear may, however, be exaggerated. It cannot
be doubted that the trial judge has the duty of preventing unfair-
ness to the accused. The involvement suggested here would
function to assure that the defendant is not being denied a full
hearing on the facts in controversy. In general, counsel's deci-
sion will prevail, but the infrequent case of inadequate prepa-
404. State v. Deal, 17 Ohio St. 2d 17, 244 N.E.2d 742 (1969);
State v. Bentley, 46 N.J. Super. 193, 134 A.2d 445 (1957).
405. Mitchell v. United States, 259 F.2d 787, 793 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 850 (1958).
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ration or unreasonable motive will be rectified at the trial level
without the need for collateral hearings. Since a trial judge's
findings supported by an adequate record are difficult to over-
turn, a decision that counsel's choice should prevail would also
eliminate the need for collateral fact-finding hearings. The re-
sult in either case should be greater airness for defendants as a
whole and the elimination of this issue in post-trial proceedings.
4. Defendant's Testifying in His Own Behalf
It has been suggested that the decision to have the defend-
ant testify is no more than a variant of the broader decision to
call particular witnesses and that accordingly the authority rests
with counsel. 40 6 It also has been argued that such a rule is nec-
essary to keep the defendant from doing himself more harm than
good:
[I]t is difficult to conceive of the average defendant making an
'intelligent and knowing' waiver ... of his privilege against
self-incrimination: Without some legal background, few persons
could understand the consequences of such a relinquishment in
terms of cross-examination, impeachment, jury effect, character
evidence, and prior criminal record. Most defendants merely
wish to 'tell my side of the story' and are oblivious to the pro-
cedural consequences of such a step.40T
A problem arises, however, that has escaped the attention
of the courts and commentators. In considering the common
law history underpinning the so-called right to proceed pro se,
it was seen that defendants at common law had the right to
tell their side of the story. It was also suggested that the early
state constitutional provisions, which seemingly established a
right to proceed pro se, may have been intended merely to pre-
serve the right of the defendant to explain the case against
him.40 8 It can be argued that the old common law right should
406. See Waltz, supra note 398, at 319. For cases holding defendant
bound by counsel's choice, see Hall v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary,
313 F.2d 483 (4th Cir. 1963); United States ex rel. Darcy v. Handy, 203
F.2d 407 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 865 (1953); Commonwealth
ex rel. Bell v. Rundle, 420 Pa. 127, 216 A.2d 57, cert. denied, 384 U.S.
966 (1966). But cf. Poe v. United States, 233 F. Supp. 173 (D.D.C. 1964)
(right to testify is personal to the accused), afid, 352 F.2d 639 (6th Cir.
1965) (but stating that counsel remain free to keep defendants from
testifying).
407. Comment, Criminal Waiver: The Requirements of Personal
Participation, Competence and Legitimate State Interest, 54 CArzF. L.
REv. 1262, 1270 (1966).
408. See text accompanying notes 99-104 supra. But cf. Sims v.
Lane, 411 F.2d 661 (7th Cir. 1969).
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not be binding on modern procedure. But if the state constitu-
tional provisions granting the right "to be heard by oneself"
were in fact aimed at preserving the right to testify, the policy
argument cannot prevail. Constitutional demands must be fol-
lowed.
The right to testify regardless of counsel's wishes should not
cause procedural problems. The trial judge should ask the de-
fendant at the close of the testimony if he wishes to testify.
The judge should also warn the defendant that a negative an-
swer would forever preclude a contrary assertion. An affirma-
tive answer would require the judge to warn the defendant of the
risks involved; but if the judge's warnings and the advice of
counsel do not overcome the defendant's will, he should be per-
mitted to testify. Such a procedure would obviate the need for
collateral proceeding to determine whether counsel prevented
the defendant from testifying.
5. Other Decisions
A general approach emerges from the particular problems
discussed. Only the defendant himself can make decisions which
relinquish a contest on the issue of guilt. Examples include the
entering of a plea of guilty and submitting the issue of guilt on
a prima facie case. Counsel must have the authority, however,
to make decisions which involve tactical or strategic judgment,
with two provisos: (1) if a substantial number of the incidents
of a full trial are being waived, the accused needs the added pro-
tection of a procedure which determines either his understanding
acquiescence or the merit to such action if he protests, and (2)
if the waiver does not affect a substantial number of the inci-
dents of a full trial, fairness and procedural efficiency can be
achieved by a procedure that determines if there is dissatisfaction
and which places the burden on the accused to justify overriding
counsel's decision. With this approach it is not difficult to as-
sign responsibility for most of the decisions that have to be made.
For example, the decision whether to object to evidence as ir-
relevant or inflammatory, 0 9 the decision whether to object to a
particular juror,410 and the decision whether to request a specific
409. See, e.g., Harried v. United States, 389 F.2d 281 (D.C. Cir.
1967); Weller v. United States, 369 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1966); Williams
v. Beto, 354 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1965); Anderson v. Peyton, 209 Va. 798,
167 S.E.2d 111 (1969); State v. Haley, 87 Ariz. 29, 347 P.2d 692 (1959).




charge to the jury411 would be for counsel to make. Unlike the
decision to call a particular witness, these decisions require more
legal acumen than the average defendant even thinks he has.
A simple query at the end of the trial as to whether the defend-
ant disagrees with counsel on any matter would suffice if cou-
pled with a warning that a negative answer would forever pre-
clude defendant's alleging disagreement. An affirmative answer
would place the burden on the accused to show his course of
action to be more meritorious than counsel's. The result in
either event would be a trial record that would eliminate the
possibility of post-trial speculation as to whether or not dis-
agreement existed and that would contain a trial judge's findings
as to why counsel's decision did or did not prevail. The defend-
ant would, of course, be able to attack counsel's decisions as
egregious under the rules previously discussed, but the defend-
ant would no longer be able to attack counsel for disregarding
his wishes or for failure to obtain consent before acting.
F. SUMMATmON
In the United States, the right to counsel must equal the right
to a fair trial. When counsel's representation denies the de-
fendant a fair trial, the sixth amendment has been violated. Es-
tablishing a fair trial as a minimum goal for all defendants does
not mean that the post-trial judiciary must be burdened by
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. To relieve the post-
trial judiciary of this burden and to assure fairness in the first
instance, the following procedural steps are recommended:
1. The trial attorney should file a confidential work sheet
with the trial judge indicating -the extent and nature of his
preparation.
2. In all cases involving guilty pleas, the trial judge should
assure himself that there is an adequate factual basis for
the plea.
3. If a significant number of the incidents of a full trial are
being waived, the trial judge should assure himself that the
defendant understandingly acquiesces; if there is disagree-
ment, counsel should have the burden of illustrating a rea-
sonable tactical objective for such waiver.
4. At the conclusion of the testimony, the trial judge should
411. See Waltz, supra note 398, at 326.
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determine if disagreement exists over calling witnesses, de-
fendant's testifying and other matters. Defendant should
be warned that a negative answer is forever binding. On
all but the decision to testify, defendant would have the
burden of convincing the judge he should prevail.
5. At sentencing, the trial judge should notify the defendant
of the right to appeal.
For the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel which
cannot be prevented by the above procedural steps, a "fairness"
test should be utilized which places on the accused the burden
of showing:
1. That there was no reasonable basis for the action or ac-
tions of counsel that are attacked, and
2. That the actions probably affected the outcome of the
case.
No system can be better than the people who administer it.
The system recommended here places the major burden on the
trial judge. If he faithfully follows these steps, it is believed that
the goals of fairness and overall efficiency will be closer to ful-
fillment.
V. CONCLUSION
A set of problems relating to the right to counsel has been
examined. When the right to counsel is viewed from such an
overall perspective, significant changes in the system of adminis-
tering criminal justice are mandated. Under the recommended
system no defendant would have the right to waive the assistance
of counsel in a trial. Mandatory representation would help as-
sure that a conviction would be procured only by fair means
since a defendant's best defense is much more likely to be pre-
sented if he is assisted by counsel. In addition, special protec-
tion would be given against unsatisfactory representation. First,
protection from the unwise waiver of objections to unconstitu-
tional government conduct would be afforded by abolishing the
waiver doctrine in this context. Second, the accused would per-
sonally have to consent to any waiver of a significant number of
the incidents of a normal, full trial. Third, the test for judging
counsel's effectiveness would be liberalized so that nothing short
of a fair trial could justify any conviction.
In addition to maximizing fairness for the accused, the new
rules would narrow the opportunity for convicts to demand post-
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trial hearings. First, it would be impossible to taunt courts with
claims that either the right to counsel or the right to proceed pro
se had been violated; the first right would be satisfied by uni-
versal representation and the second right would be nonexistent.
Second, post-trial hearings to determine if counsel's waivers were
"deliberate" or "knowing" would not be necesary in the context
of objections to constitutional defects, as such waivers would not
be permissible. In addition, post-trial hearings would not be
necessary to determine the constitutional legality of evidence,
because a pre-trial hearing would be mandatory. Third, the trial
judge's new role at trial would create a record, showing either
agreement or disagreement with counsel, that would obviate the
need for many post-trial hearings. Finally, because of these
measures, the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel would be
difficult to assert without specific and detailed allegations of
counsel's shortcomings.
In short, the collateral issues engendered by the right to
have the assistance of counsel require a revolutionizing of the
substantive and procedural aspects of criminal justice adminis-
tration. Such a "revolution," however, should be welcomed by
all segments of the philosophical spectrum, for it seeks both fair-
ness and finality.
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